Who Governs the Sea? An Analysis of the Regime Complex in International Shipping by Landon, Brent
City University of New York (CUNY) 
CUNY Academic Works 
All Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone 
Projects Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects 
6-2020 
Who Governs the Sea? An Analysis of the Regime Complex in 
International Shipping 
Brent Landon 
The Graduate Center, City University of New York 
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know! 
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/3816 
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu 






WHO GOVERNS THE SEA? 
 
 
















A master’s thesis submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in partial fulfillment of 





























© 2020  
BRENT LANDON  







Who Governs the Sea?: An Analysis of the Regime Complex in International Shipping 
by 
Brent Landon 
This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty by Brent Landon in 





_______________      _________________________ 





_______________      _________________________ 
Date  Alyson Cole 















Who Governs the Sea?: An Analysis of the Regime Complex in International Shipping 
by  
Brent Landon  
Advisor: Stephanie R. Golob  
 
In many respects, international shipping represents the physical embodiment of globalization. It 
ties states together via the exchange of raw materials and finished goods in ways that inspire 
important questions about power distributions, trade, growth, global governance, jurisdiction, 
policy coordination, sovereignty, and regimes. Although shipping is a space that can be used to 
illustrate many International Relations ideas, it has been understudied in International 
Relations. This thesis argues that the international shipping regime complex produces 
suboptimal outcomes because it has inefficient and peculiar design features. Specifically, it 
locates the responsibility to enforce rules in states that lack the ability to do so and gives 
authority to make rules to actors that have clear conflicts of interest. Regional efforts have 
corrected the location of authority to enforce rules but have ultimately not been able to 
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In the later case of the Amoco Cadiz, the ship had been built in Spain, had US owners, an Italian 
crew and was carrying Arabian crude oil to a Dutch refinery; a West German tug towed the 
vessel from French waters. 
-Edgar Gold  
 
 






 This thesis is a study of international shipping through the lens of International Relations 
(IR). International shipping as a topic has been studied in several overlapping fields including 
economics, geography, logistics, environmental science and others. Essentially, it is a prism that 
provides different insights when viewed from different angles. As a topic in IR, it is rather niche: 
issues related to international shipping pop up from time to time in juxtaposition to other 
arguments, but rarely are they the focus of study or scrutiny on their own.1 And yet, 
international shipping is an excellent space to illustrate various IR theories and frameworks. 
Specific to IR, it has implications for distributions of global power, the effectiveness of 
international organizations (IOs) and regimes, international political economy, globalization, 
sovereignty, trade, and more. In a way, it is the physical embodiment of globalization; it is the 
physical component of the trade of both raw materials and finished goods between states 
across oceans. It is the means by which the states and cultures of the world exchange goods; 
whether geographically specific types of raw materials, or anthropologically produced articles 
of culture. International shipping requires coordination of policies, institutions, ideas, and 
norms by multitudes of states and other actors to function optimally and efficiently.  
 This thesis is concerned with exploring who governs the sea. It asks which states and 
actors have power, how much power they have, and how they exercise it. In their work, Who 
Governs the Globe?, Avant et al. frame their understanding of global governance as “Thinking of 
 
1 Notable works include Strange, “Who Runs International Shipping”; Palan, “The Emergence of an Offshore 
Economy”; and Cafruny, Ruling the Waves. 




the structure of global politics as a complex web of relationships among different authorities, 
accomplishing different tasks and dependent on one another for outcomes” (2010: p 4). I 
believe international shipping can be approached the same way. The types of structures and 
relationships that exist in international shipping not only shape the way shipping is governed 
but have also changed over time. This thesis looks specifically at how global governance in 
international shipping has evolved since the end of World War II and how it might change in the 
future.  
It is fundamentally important which states and actors have power, how much power 
they have, how they exercise it, and which states and actors determine and set rules. 
International shipping is different from other economic activities in that what it produces isn’t 
located inside states; ships travel between states, and because of this, the jurisdictions that 
they operate in are not static, but variable. Ships aren’t owned by states, ports, or traditional 
goods producers, but by independent business owners and management companies not 
necessarily tethered in any meaningful way to any certain geographic jurisdiction. Their place in 
the world is hard to pin down. Ships can be built in one state, owned in another, registered in a 
third state, crewed by a fourth, and carry goods from a fifth to a sixth. Curiously, many of these 
activities do not need to occur with any genuine link2 to the state, owner, company or crew that 
the activities are related to in order to be associated with those states in the way described 
above. For instance, a ship can be owned by a person or group that never sees it or sets foot on 
it, or registered in a state whose port it has never called at. It is technically and legally 
associated with the state where it is registered, regardless of whether it has been there or not. 
 
2 The importance of this term will be explained in Chapter 2.  




Therein lies what makes shipping so interesting. Many of the state centered arguments that 
exist in other conversations in IR—conversations of power, self-interest, institutions, principles, 
norms, alliances, regimes etc—operate in geographically diffuse ways when applied in 
international shipping. Indeed, reflected by the vast, anonymous quality of the open sea, 
shipping is a political domain that blurs and obscures territorial relationships.  
International shipping is a topic that does not map neatly onto traditional conversations 
in IR. After all, in the two most prominent schools of IR—the rational schools of the realists and 
liberals—it is presumed that states are the most important level of analysis. In international 
shipping, states play a role, but perhaps not even the main role; shipowners hold much of the 
power, due in part to the diffuse nature of power in shipping and the peculiar institutional 
design of the IOs that govern it. Meanwhile, constructivists analyze global politics from a 
perspective of how the world is historically and socially constructed through the passing of 
time. The history of the current era of shipping is important in telling the story of how we have 
arrived where we are today, but it does not fully explain why it has been so difficult to change 
where power resides or how it is exercised. Either approach, rational or constructivist, can 
contribute to a story of international shipping. But a better story emerges from using concepts 
and ideas from both approaches as well as concepts from international law.  
 The elusive character of territorial relationships in shipping also creates a unique map of 
power relations. Power in international shipping does not reside in the same dominant, 
developed states that it does in say, global security or international development. Instead, it 
resides in both the center and periphery of the global economy: by shipowners and private 
industry actors primarily in developed states; and in various developing states that sell their 




sovereignty to them, thus becoming the jurisdictions with the power to set the rules, principles, 
and norms through a regime complex with peculiar design features. Shipowners register their 
ships in states in return for low or non-existent taxes and fees and the promise of flexible laws 
and lax observance of international regulations. These states, called flags of convenience (FOC), 
also work to influence the terms of international cooperation and coordination in IOs like the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) in ways that perpetuate their ability to set favorable 
terms for owners seeking their registries.  
 Considerable effort has been made to change the current arrangement, which allows 
states to sell their sovereignty in return for fees and taxes considered small by governments in 
the developed world, but significant in the developing world. A decades-long international legal 
effort sought to create a necessity for ships to be registered in states where they have a 
genuine link, but ultimately failed in the International Court of Justice (ICJ). More effective has 
been the use of Port State Control (PSC), an enforcement mechanism used by port states to 
slow down or halt the passage and unloading of ships that do not comply with international 
instruments. Though effective to a certain extent, this mechanism has been employed in way 
that varies from region to region.  
 This thesis is ultimately concerned with assessing the effectiveness of governance in the 
international shipping regime. Like other postwar issue areas studied in IR, shipping developed 
a rules-based system led by an IO. The regime has developed a lot of good rules since the end 
of the era of great power wars. But good rules and regulations are useless if they don’t create 
good results. I will argue that the international shipping regime complex produces suboptimal 
outcomes because it has inefficient and peculiar design features. By suboptimal, I mean that 




international instruments are routinely violated in ways with real costs to seafarers and the 
shared global environment. The regime is inefficient because considerable effort and resources 
are put into governing international shipping, only to result in these suboptimal outcomes. 
Several peculiar design features allow for this, but principal among them is the assignment of 
authority to flag states to enforce international instruments. This creates not only a conflict of 
interest but a set of challenges that FOC states struggle to deal with for lack of resources and 
limited proximity.  
I will critically assess the regime’s efforts to regulate the behavior of shipowners, which 
have been made on two levels. First, the IMO and the International Labor Organization (ILO) are 
the IOs responsible for governing on the international level. Although both have produced 
many international instruments to govern shipping, the different institutional designs of the 
two IOs have implications for the success of their efforts. The primary IO in charge of regulating 
shipping, the IMO, is a black box with a convoluted process for legislating that 
disproportionately favors FOC states over traditional registries. Because of this, FOCs can 
advance the perpetuation of a system that primarily benefits themselves and private-industry 
stakeholders at the expense of laborers and the environment. The ILO has been more effective 
in the shipping space, as it explicitly gives workers a seat at the table in creating regulations, but 
only covers labor issues in the regime complex, leaving environmental and security issues 
strictly in the purview of the IMO. Thus, some issues in shipping have overlap in the two IOs, 
while most are covered by the weaker of the two. Although IOs are often conceived to 
incentivize compliance and ensure enforcement, the IOs that operate in international shipping 




have not been able to adequately overcome the international shipping regime complex’s 
peculiar design features. 
Second, on a regional level, Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) implement PSC to 
regulate shipowner behavior. Although the two IOs originally put the burden of enforcing 
international instruments on flag states, port states—because of their immediate proximity to 
the ships in question—are a much more effective locus for holding flag states accountable to 
their international commitments. The European Community made the the first regional effort 
to move the authority to enforce international instruments to port states. Later, the IMO 
embraced the move of authority by encouraging other regions to follow suit. These regional 
efforts have been successful because they modify actor incentives. Many FOCs essentially 
operate like businesses, providing loose regulatory environments in order to attract the 
business of shipowners and collect rents. By threatening their profitability through reputational 
damage, PSC is an effective means for encouraging shifts in shipowner behavior. Port State 
Control Officers (PSCOs) and union dockworkers can refuse to load or unload ships from states 
that routinely violate certain instruments conceived by the IMO and ILO. This causes delays and 
inefficiencies for shipping companies at best, and blacklisting at worst. Both result in 
reputational damage for FOCs, and ultimately encourage them to comply with specific 
instruments in order to retain business by way of registration. PSC is effective, but it is also 
implemented in an uneven manner that may make it unnecessarily difficult for ships operating 
in multiple regions to comply. Thus, even with a decent enforcement mechanism, the regime 
complex still struggles to produce optimal results.  




It may help to imagine what an optimal regime in international shipping would 
hypothetically look like. An optimal regime would have very different features than described in 
this thesis. First, the assignment of authority would not be arbitrary or nominal. Shipowners, 
regardless of where they registered their ships, would be held accountable for their actions. 
Second, power balances would be mitigated, not exacerbated in the IMO. The ILO already 
provides a representation model that could help the IMO immunize itself against industry 
capture. But beyond that, states that have large nominal fleets would not have power 
proportionate to this mostly arbitrary measure. Third, a higher level of collaboration and 
coordination would be implemented between international and regional bodies in the regime. 
Regional MOUs would implement uniform application and report results back to the IOs. If 
operating optimally, the regime would naturally minimize noncompliance and flagging out—the 
practice by shipowners of flagging ships to registries that offer lax regulatory compliance and 
oversight in return for minimal taxes and fees. Unfortunately, the system as it exists does not 
resemble this optimal hypothetical scenario. Thus, I seek to explain how and why the regime 
complex in international shipping operates suboptimally, and what can be done to fix it.  
 This thesis will proceed in the following manner. The first chapter is a literature review 
that explores existing IR work on shipping, and places this thesis in the context of other relevant 
IR conversations. It discusses conversations in global governance, regime theory, institutional 
design, compliance, and regionalism. 
 The second chapter describes why shipping is difficult to govern. It provides history of 
two important developments in international shipping, one political, and one technological. 
First, it describes how the FOC system developed and legitimized the peculiar assignment of 




authority to flag states. Second, it describes how the development of the container accelerated 
industry growth and contributed to increased globalization.  
 The third chapter describes how these two developments compounded labor, 
environmental, and security issues in international shipping. It also describes how time plays a 
role in exacerbating these issues; in particular how the  lifecycle of ships affects the regime 
complex’s ability govern.  
 The fourth chapter maps the current regime complex in international shipping. It shows 
how states, shipowners and shipping companies, unions, IOs, NGOs, transnational organizations 
and non-state actors interact in ways that create regime complexity. It also provides a visual 
map to give the reader an idea of just how complex governance in this space is.  
 The fifth chapter details the inner workings of the two IOs that govern in the 
international regime complex. It compares the IMO and the ILO using an institutional design 
lens. The IMO is designed in a way that gives disproportionate power to FOCs and creates the 
appearance of conflict of interest and a lack of transparency. On the other hand, the ILO 
exhibits a more straightforward design that prioritizes a plurality of stakeholder input and 
emphasizes assessment and results. I conclude from this comparison that the IMO would 
function more effectively if it adopted certain design features of the ILO.  
 The sixth chapter details the development of a regional level response to the regime 
complex’s lack of enforcement. Regional MOUs use PSC to shift the authority to enforce 
international instruments from flag states to port states, thus creating a more effective 
enforcement mechanism. Having a strong enforcement mechanism that creates costs for non-




compliance is an effective method for encouraging higher rates of compliance, and ultimately, 
better behavior on the part of shipowners. As a regional effort, PSC both corrects the peculiar 
assignment of authority in the IMO and ensures broad enough coverage to ensure that ships 
can’t just skip to the next closest state, as they might be able to in a case where an individual 
state had particularly strict policies.  
Finally, I conclude that although the international shipping regime complex has peculiar 
design features and operates at a suboptimal level, significant changes could increase its ability 
to govern. First, the institutional design of the IMO needs to be overhauled such to mitigate the 
effects of flagging out. One of the most important changes would be to shift authority away 
from flag states—both in representation in the two legislative bodies of the IMO, and in having 
accountability for enforcing instruments. Second, regional MOUs need to work to create a 
uniform application of PSC. Doing so could significantly reduce noncompliance on the part of 
shipowners. Third, more coordination between IOs and regional MOUs would help create a 
more effective all-around regime. Better communication between the two levels of governance 
would incentivize good shipowner behavior by increasing accountability.  
 
  




Chapter 1: Literature Review 
 International shipping provides a great lens into issues related to International Relations 
(IR) and globalization. It can be an exciting way to analyze how the physical element of trade 
effects relationships of power, territoriality, and sovereignty, as well as how actors and 
institutions build and shift legitimacy and authority. These topics are central to the study of IR 
and crucial to understanding international shipping as a political space. Shipping is a sort of hub 
that needs to be connected to six spokes, or theoretical conversations in IR: the offshore 
economy, globalization and global governance, regime theories, institutional design, 
compliance, and regionalism. 
In order to understand how international shipping relates to IR, this thesis begins by 
discussing arguments and works relevant to my core arguments. First, it will look at existing 
works in IR related to international shipping and the offshore economy. Though a few works in 
IR have focused on international shipping, they have approached the topic by making 
arguments related to the political economy shipping, and how it exists in the offshore economy. 
Second, it will look at work that discusses global governance and the tension between 
globalization and sovereignty. Finding out who governs the sea is inextricably linked to 
understanding who governs the globe. Third, it is necessary look at works related to regime 
theory. I will argue that what exists in international shipping is a regime complex, so it is 
important to understand what that means, how regime complexity is related to effectiveness. 
Fourth, it discusses ideas related to institutional design. A key part of understanding 
international shipping is understanding what the design of the two most prominent multilateral 
international organizations (IOs) in shipping implies for the effectiveness of governance. Fifth, it 




will look at arguments about compliance. We need to know why shipowners and states comply, 
and why they do not, in order to understand whether the regime complex in international 
shipping operates in an optimal way. Finally, it considers conversations around regionalism, as 
regional responses have played a key role in reshaping the regime complex in international 
shipping.  
1.1 International Shipping and International Relations 
Little work in IR has focused solely on international shipping, even though shipping is a 
useful issue area for demonstrating IR concepts and theories. Some notable exceptions were 
useful in understanding this topic and structuring this thesis. These works mainly address how 
and whether hegemony shapes international shipping as a political space, and are related to 
the political economy of shipping, and shipping as a space in the offshore economy.  
Cafruny (1985; 1987) details how the international shipping regime has shifted since the 
end of World War II. According to him the US played a hegemonic role in setting up the new 
regime. The US allowed the European conference system to remain in place for liner shipping, 
as it already had a robust structure and also allowed European states to retain a significant 
semblance of power and to gain capital to pay off debts incurred during the war. Thus, the US 
effectively ceded power to European states in liner shipping. In bulk shipping—the shipping of 
raw materials—it seized power from traditional maritime states by allowing US shipping 
companies to register and crew ships in offshore jurisdictions. US nationals even played a role 
in facilitating the setup of the Liberian registry for the convenience of US companies. This is 
explained in greater detail in Chapter 2. Thus, like many other international issue areas in the 




postwar era, the US hegemonic approach—via institution and regime building—was pivotal in 
shaping the international shipping political space.  
Regime complexity in international shipping has been considered in two works. Strange 
(1976) analyzed complexity from a political economy perspective, noting that aside from the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO), International Labor Organization (ILO) and United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) most of the other bodies in shipping 
are more concerned with business, not regulation. She observed that although the regime is 
fairly complex, it seemed to be trending toward less efficiency: 
The world shipping business seems to be headed for decreased efficiency, and for 
increased inequity and continued instability. It is in a condition of relative anarchy 
dangerous to the environment and to human life, and potentially very disruptive both to 
the rest of the world economy and to the political relations between governments-and 
even perhaps to politics within states (Strange 1976: p 364) 
 Couper et al. (1999) argue that both the growth in regime complexity and the growth in 
economic/trade activity in global shipping are exacerbating the former’s ability to govern the 
later.  
International legislation has clearly not kept pace with the changes in the structure of 
the industry. What in effect has happened over the past three decades is a growth in the 
gulf between the components of shipping embodied in seafaring labour, finances, 
sectoral representation (ITF and ISF) and lawmaking (the IMO, the ILO and UNCTAD), all 
at global levels, and the enforcement of international regulations at nation-state levels. 
(Couper et al. 1999: p 177) 
 
In their view, instruments created by the ILO and IMO needed to be integrated and ports 
should refuse ships that lack protection and indemnity insurance. They argue that adopting 
such approaches even at the top eight or so biggest ports could catalyze a normative shift 




across all or most of the world’s ports. In Chapter 5, I will argue that the IMO could produce 
more optimal outcomes if it adopted some of the design features of the ILO.  
Shipping exists both physically and theoretically in what is called the offshore space. 
Palan (1999) conceptualized the idea of “offshore” as secondary to the state system, involving 
“relatively unregulated juridical spaces” that the free market could develop beside the 
increasingly regulated market.  
The juridical space of sovereignty, therefore, is bifurcating into two simultaneous 
domains, one still very much ‘on-shore’, subject to the strict controls, regulations and 
taxation of individual states; the other consists of ‘fictitious spaces’ known as ‘off-
shore’. The offshore economy is a new and relatively unregulated realm in which 
economic transactions take place with minimal intervention by the state. (Palan 1998: p 
64). 
It helps to think of the offshore economy as developing alongside the onshore economy, as 
opposed to below it, or outside of it. In a way both economies exist to protect sovereign 
territorial rights, the strategies used by states and actors in different ways. In a later work, 
Palan (2002) argues that tax havens, an important element of “offshore,” developed as a result 
of technological improvements, global financialization, the strengthening of juridical unity:  
Paradoxically, improvements in communication and transportation technologies and 
accelerating capital mobility have been accompanied not by any loosening of the 
juridical unity of the state but by, if anything, the strengthening of it. The ensuing 
conflict between the increasing insulation of the state in law and the 
internationalization of capital forced a series of pragmatic solutions, one of which 
proved conducive to the development of the tax haven and the commercialization of 
sovereignty (Palan 2002: p 153). 
The existence of the offshore economy is theorized to lead to a “race to the bottom” 
regarding acceptable sets of regulatory standards applied by states. FOC states compete to 
offer the lowest taxes, fees and regulatory compliance, and thus in order to compete, other 




states—Flags of Convenience (FOC) and non-FOCs—adopt less stringent policies. According to 
Desombre (2008), the presence of Port State Control, accompanied with the phenomenon of 
second and national registries creates a “race to the middle.” PSC influences FOC states to 
comply more, which raises the floor to some extent. The presence of second and national 
registries3 drives compliance on top performing states down, which lowers the ceiling. In 
Chapter 6, I will examine the effectiveness of PSC—how it was created, how it shifted authority, 
and the extent to which it is effective.  
 Outside of these IR works on international shipping, much of the work relevant to this 
thesis comes from IR conversations that can be related to shipping, or shipping conversations 
that can related in IR terms. Although the following sections reference works not specific to 
shipping, I am looking to them because they provide context to some of the arguments that 
help describe who governs the sea. 
1.2 Globalization, Sovereignty, and Global Governance 
The increasingly global character of markets and industry has been seen by many as 
creating important implications and raising challenges to the concept of sovereignty with at 
least one scholar contending that humanity had reached its final ideological stage (Fukuyama 
1993), and another remarking that sovereignty is verging on being completely wiped out 
(Castells 1998).4 The debate in IR has essentially focused on the relationship between global 
governance and state power: that is, whether global governance diminishes or neutralized state 
 
3 Some developed states have created alternative registries to compete with FOC states. For instance, the United 
Kingdom has registries in Bermuda and Gibraltar, and Germany and France both have “International Ship 
Registries” with different standards than they have nationally.  
4 “Nation-states will survive, but not so their sovereignty.” (Castells 1998: p 355) 




sovereignty. Strange (1995) contends that the nature of competition between states has shifted 
from one wherein they compete for territory in which to create capital to one in which they 
compete for the right to compete for market share. 
…when I say that the nature of states and their behavior has changed, I mean that 
industrial policy and trade policy are becoming more important than defense and 
foreign policy. States are obliged by structural change to seek commercial allies rather 
than military ones. Some of these allies will be other states, as in regional economic 
associations. Others will be foreign-owned firms. And the agendas for interstate 
discussion and bargaining are also changing, as are the issues arising in domestic politics 
(Strange 1995: p 56). 
In this view, states are suffering a decline in authority, becoming hollow vessels that protect 
economic activity above all else. Regarding shipping, the picture is less clear. Certainly, some 
states seek to protect the parts of the market they have captured. In fact, private industry 
actors sometimes represent states they do not even have any genuine connection to in the 
IMO. But states still have authority to the extent that they can regulate shipping at the ports—
which is not much, though still significant.  
 Sassen (1999) agrees that globalization is diminishing the role of the state. According to 
her, globalization—specifically regarding financial capital—is creating new challenges for states 
because of a growth in the need for “central functions” across territorial jurisdictions that 
states can’t possibly fulfill under the sovereign state system. The complexity of international 
firms grows as they operate in multiple states, thus requiring more coordination of 
management-level activities. Notably, the growth in managing central functions develops faster 
in the “global cities” of developed states like New York, London, Paris and Tokyo.  
The spread of activity across borders has also witnessed the creation of new legal 
regimes. Massey (1984) describes how globalization created specialization across the 




production infrastructure. In a similar sense, international shipping is an extremely globalized 
industry that pushes specific states to specialize in specific sectors of the industry. Ships are 
primarily built in Southeast Asian states, owned in European states, registered in open 
registries—often microstates, crewed by certain states—especially the Philippines and 
Malaysia, and broken down on the Indian subcontinent. The service sector for shipping also 
spans across multiple jurisdictions, with certain states specializing in financing, insuring, 
crewing and managing ships (Ogle 2017).  
  Other theorists are skeptical that globalization is transforming the nature of state 
sovereignty. In Krasner’s (1999) view, states—particularly developing states—have always had 
to deal with threats to internal control. “Globalization arguments are historically myopic, 
sometimes implicitly assuming some golden age in the past where states could exercise 
effective control, and ignoring the fact that many measures of international flows were as high 
at the end of the nineteenth century as they are now” (Krasner 1999: p 37). He finds that claims 
that globalization is affecting sovereignty are exaggerated, likening it to the early century 
academic focus on industrialization that ignored prior relevant technological shifts. In shipping, 
I find this argument unconvincing. Although shipping has always been difficult to govern, there 
was a fundamental loss of control that happened once the FOC system was legitimized. 
Afterwards, it became nearly impossible for states to reclaim authority over owners that flag 
out, a reality that persists to this day. That is not to say that the sovereignty of states has been 
erased or moved to shipowners or other actors in any exclusive way. Sovereignty is something 
of a slippery term. Kalmo and Skinner (2010) point out a perennial tension in the term:  




The general assumption underlying claims that sovereignty is today being whittled away 
tends to be that it can be equated with independence, the very opposite of 
interdependence, and showing that the latter has increased sufficiently proves that the 
former is ‘in decline’.” (Kalmo and Skinner 2010: p 6). 
 
Sovereignty may not necessarily be zero sum. Much can be gained from interdependence. 
Losing authority or control can be gradual, and specific to a certain issue area—trade, security 
etc. The result is not the total loss of power, but a diffusion of authority. Because sovereignty is 
fragmented across issues and actors, new arrangements of sovereignty can occur in a 
piecemeal fashion, and ceding authority is not necessarily always final. This has become clear in 
recent years with the reinvigoration of nationalism, especially in Western states.  
 Others find that new formations of sovereignty often result in familiar power 
distillations. In Cohen’s (2012) view, sovereignty may be diffuse for some states, but the most 
powerful states retain it by using institutions and technology. 
Sovereignty in the classic, absolutist (predatory) sense remains alive and well, but only 
for very powerful states – including those controlling global governance institutions (the 
P5: the permanent members of the UNSC) – while new technologies and practices of 
control are created through the innovative use of unaccountable and legally 
unconstrained power accumulating in those institutions – something the functionalist 
discourse of gradations of sovereignty and neo-trusteeship plays into. (Cohen 2012: p 4) 
 
She is skeptical that global governance is diluting the power of sovereign states, and instead 
argues that it is superimposed on top of the sovereign state system. That is to say, that both 
exist simultaneously, “dualistically” in her terms. States are sovereign but so are global 
governance regimes. This is certainly present to an extent in international shipping, as states do 
or do not enter into agreements voluntarily and choose whether or not to enforce their 
commitments on their or other states’ fleets. Meanwhile states can be subject to PSC when 
their registered ships enter another state’s ports. 




 The legitimization of flagging out blurred the lines of which actors represent which 
states and interests while governing in the international shipping regime complex. It changed 
the motivations of different actors in different ways. Avant et al. argue that  
Global governance – and politics more generally – is a dynamic process. Each new 
governing arrangement alters the structures, rules, and opportunities that came before. 
Governors and would-be governors adjust well, or poorly, or not at all, to the attendant 
changes (Avant et al. 2010: p 17). 
 
Thus, once flagging out was legitimized, it slowly became normalized and transformed the 
shipping regime. Traditional maritime powers—wealthy, mostly Western states—lost authority 
over their national fleets to FOC states, shipowners were incentivized to profit by flagging out, 
and private industry actors were given the opportunity to represent states in the IMO. 
Authority and power shifted accordingly.  
1.3 Regime Theory 
In theory, global governance encompasses all issue areas, but in reality, issue areas are 
most often governed by regimes. Actors and institutions with special knowledge are 
understood to be required for specific issues (Haas 1992). This is especially clear with shipping, 
as the issue area is both highly technical and cordoned off from much of the public. The most 
common explanation and discussion starter for regimes in IR comes from Krasner’s volume on 
the topic (1983). Krasner’s definition of regimes is famous by this point: “Regimes can be 
defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures 
around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations” (Krasner 
1983: p 186). Issue areas obviously require coordination on multiple levels—international, 
regional, local, public, private etc.—and so regimes encompass virtually all aspects of global 
governance around an issue area. Regimes alter self-interested decision-making, as they 




require some level of willful coordination between actors (Jervis 1982). Regimes encompass the 
entire informal environment that determine the rules of the game in specific issue areas.  
Debate around regimes centers on how effective they are governing in issue-areas: 
some authors claim they foster cooperation while others claim actors’ motivations within 
regimes reflect existing power balances. Keohane argues that “regimes make it easier for actors 
to realize their interests collectively,” (1982: p 354), that public goods problems help create 
demand for regimes, and that regimes foster collaboration in ways that alter states’ behavior. 
In an issue area as massive and geographically spread out as shipping, regimes certainly help 
actors understand and affect each others’ incentives. Puchala and Hopkins argue that regimes 
act as limiters to states that seek to act unilaterally, that they “mediate under conditions of 
diffuse power,” and during power transitions (1982: p 271). Regimes encourage a certain 
amount of consensus, whether through institutions, or principles, or norms.  
Not all IR theorists are convinced. Stein (1982) argues that the existence of regimes is 
totally consistent with realist assertions that states act solely out of self-interest, that in fact 
states create regimes because it is in their self-interest to do so. Strange (1982) says that the 
entire concept of regimes may be just a “passing fad,” while agreeing that regimes appear 
organized to benefit those in power. According to her, regimes are just another way for the 
powerful to exert power over the less powerful and that they allow the powerful to make 
explicit rules for doing such. This idea does not explain the behavior of the international 
shipping regime complex, however, where a handful of developing states—often seen as 
lacking power in other areas—and private industry actors seem to exert the most power.  




What is far more likely, is what Keohane and Nye theorized in Power and 
Interdependence (1977). Asymmetrical power imbalances develop and persist despite 
interdependent regime structures, and power dynamics in one issue area do not necessarily 
reflect the status quo in another.  
It is asymmetries in dependence that are most likely to provide sources of influence for 
actors in their dealings with one another. Less dependent actors can often use the 
interdependent relationship as a source of power in bargaining over an issue and 
perhaps to affect other issues. (Keohane and Nye 1977: p 9) 
 
It may be easier to see this idea illustrated in shipping than in other issue areas, where the 
traditional world powers, all developed states, struggle to control the regulatory process or to 
wrest power from the FOC states, which are mostly developing states. The developed states’ 
economies are much more dependent on trade, allowing the shipowners and FOC states to 
leverage power over them.  
It is my contention that what exists in international shipping is not simply a regime, but 
a regime complex. Alter and Meunier originally differentiated regime complexity from regimes 
as follows: “International regime complexity refers to the presence of nested, partially over-
lapping, and parallel international regimes that are not hierarchically ordered” (2009: p14). 
Alter and Raustiala further elaborated on the concept:  
The institutions and agreements may be functional or territorial in nature. International 
regime complexity refers to international political systems of global governance that 
emerge because of the coexistence of rule density and regime complexes (2018: p 333). 
 
Essentially, regime complexes exist in spaces where a single regime fails to encapsulate total 
authority in an issue area. Thus, there are multiple, continuous, overlapping efforts of various 
type and character that attempt to govern in the issue area of question. International shipping, 




in this case, involves a combination of international efforts, regional efforts, state efforts, union 
efforts, international instruments, agreements, certification processes, norms, principles, 
expectations, etc., that taken together comprise a regime complex, while failing to completely 
cover the issue area, and thus leaving ample wiggle room for manipulation, noncompliance and 
exploitation. Chapter 4 will explain in detail the parts of the international shipping regime 
complex, and how they overlap and interact.  
Drezner argues that regime complexity, what he alternatively calls “institutional 
thickness,” creates space for power transfer and forum shopping, ultimately weakening global 
governance.  
As global governance structures morph from international regimes to regime 
complexes, legal and organizational proliferation can shift world politics from rule-based 
outcomes to power-based outcomes. Proliferation enhances the ability of powerful 
states to engage in forum shopping relative to other actors. (2013: p 2)  
Different coalitions of actors seek to exert power in different forums. The IMO reflects the 
power structure of the FOC system, while the ILO’s tripartite structure mitigates it to a certain 
extent by explicitly balancing representation. UNCTAD is more suited for the grievances of 
developing states. In my view, it is not powerful states that are emboldened by the regime 
complex in international shipping, but a combination of developing states in cooperation with 
powerful private-industry actors. Krasner (1985) points out that developing states often oppose 
trade liberalization not on ideological grounds, but because it threatens to undermine their 
local economic power. In a realist interpretation, developing states are driven by rational self-
interests just like developed states, to maintain whatever system confers the most power on 
them. In shipping, that means perpetuating the FOC system, which allows them to collect 




greater rents than a system that accurately reflected any genuine linkage of ownership or 
operation to states. In this way, developing states have a mutually beneficial relationship with 
private-industry stakeholders, both of which seek the perpetuation of the current regime 
complex. 
1.4 Institutional Design 
 Some of the most important actors in the international shipping regime complex are its 
foremost IOs, the IMO and the ILO. It is crucial to understand how the design of these 
organizations lead to inefficient and suboptimal outcomes in international shipping. Thus, it is 
important to review works on institutional design. There is some conversation as to whether 
the design of institutions—in this case IOs, agreements, and other procedures of global 
governance—affect the outcomes they produce in the ways they are intended to: by lowering 
transaction costs, increasing transparency and communication etc. But a more nuanced 
conversation is not whether, but how the design of institutions affect the outcomes they 
produce. There is tension between how to include enough states and actors to make 
institutions legitimate, on the one hand, and the ability of institutions to create efficient and 
optimal outcomes on the other.  
To realists and rational choice theorists, it seems unlikely that states would take part in 
organizations or agreements that limit their bargaining power in ways that completely flatten 
the playing field. Koremenos et al. argue that “states use international institutions to further 
their own goals, and they design institutions accordingly” (2001: p 762). In their view states 
design institutions to further their goals by limiting or expanding membership, the scope of 
issues covered, centering or decentering tasks, controlling the use of rules and the flexibility of 




agreements. When designing institutions, states can limit membership to states that likely have 
similar goals, for instance, or can narrow the scope of the institution in order to preclude areas 
in which they wish to maintain control. Limiting membership to states and actors with common 
goals may facilitate expeditious work, but the measures taken may not apply to the states and 
actors that need to address the issue-area. If Western states create rules for FOC shipping 
without the consent of the FOC states, for example, can the Western states legitimately enforce 
those rules? In that sense, expanding membership to include particular states and actors is 
necessary.  
In order for institutions to have greater legitimacy, they must be designed to attract the 
participation of the most powerful states in the regime. Mitchell and Keilbach describe how 
asymmetric externalities effect institutional design. That is, when externalities affect one actor 
or set of actors more than another, there is more incentive variation in designing institutions. 
Asymmetric externalities result in “severe distributional and enforcement problems, which lead 
states to create institutions that involve linkages that broaden their scope” (Mitchell and 
Keilbach 2001: 916). That is to say, it is difficult for weak states affected most by a problem to 
lure powerful states causing the problem into an institution that restricts their behavior. In 
shipping this may be flipped on its head, to some extent. Developed states, lacking large fleets, 
need FOC states to be part of the IOs in order for the IOs to be legitimate. Thus, the IOs need to 
be designed in a way that doesn’t divert power from FOC states or affect their ability to capture 
rents in order to include them. The IMO Assembly, for instance, gives states voting power 
proportionate to registered tonnage, effectively giving FOCs the most power. This may be 
suboptimal design, in that it does not correct the peculiar assignment of authority to FOCs, but 




the IO would be less legitimate if it didn’t include FOCs at all, as they are a prominent part of 
the current shipping regime complex. 
 Whether or not states join organizations or enter into agreements can depend to a 
certain extent on their ability to deliver on the promises laid out. Rosendorff and Milner show 
that almost all trade agreements are designed with “safeguard” or “escape” clauses for 
instance, that offer states flexibility by allowing them to op-out or not comply under certain 
circumstances. They believe that escape clauses are actually important because “ international 
institutions that include an escape clause can generate more durable and stable cooperative 
regimes” (Rosendorff and Milner 2001: p 852). In the case of instruments created by the IMO 
and ILO, Conventions lacked a reasonable enforcement mechanism for most of their existence, 
while other instruments simply aren’t binding. Thus, states can comfortably enter into most 
instruments with little or no effort made to comply in practice.  
1.5 Compliance  
 Good institutional design is important for creating good rules but does not necessarily 
ensure compliance. Once institutions are created, rules also need to be crafted with care, so as 
to affect the right parts of the regime in a way that all members and actors can agree with. 
Some authors claim that rules need to be broad enough to attract the relevant parties, but 
others feel that broadening the scope of rules may make agreement easier, but rules less 
meaningful. Chayes and Chayes assert that noncompliance decisions by states are not 
necessarily calculated by rational self-interests, and that the “treaty regime as a whole need not 
and should not be held to a standard of strict compliance but to a level of overall compliance 
that is ‘acceptable’ in the light of the interests and concerns the treaty is designed to 




safeguard” (1993: p 176). In other words, institutions should be designed to have broad enough 
rules to allow for some measure of partial compliance, in order to be satisfactory for the many 
parties, while still addressing their primary concerns. The result, according to Downes et al. is it 
may appear that compliance levels in international regimes are generally good or acceptable 
because “most treaties require states to make only modest departures from what they would 
have done in the absence of an agreement” (1996: p 380). If the treaty does not require a big 
change in behavior, it is a lot easier for states to simply comply and benefit reputationally. Thus, 
the treaties that allow many states to make modest adjustments are most likely to have high 
uptake and appear more legitimate. This is probably why very many of the IMO Conventions, 
which are legally binding, are ratified by most states, and very few are highly contested. Similar 
to the P5 in the UN, much of the bargaining in the IMO Council is done behind closed doors and 
presented afterward with the appearance of consensus. This can obscure particular 
disagreements and concessions made in the bargaining process. 
 Even good rules may not ensure an optimal amount of compliance. Good rules may be 
negated, by norms of noncompliance. According to Checkel, “compliance with norms is a 
process encompassing both instrumental choice and social learning” (2001: p 581). In his view, 
“institutional legacies” frustrate new members’ tendency toward compliance, domestic 
structures effect compliance on an individual level, and preexisting norms can be determinative 
of whether specific states comply with rules. I will argue that negligence toward compliance 
was the norm for most of the history of the current regime complex because of peculiar design 
features and a lack of consequences for non-compliance. Although FOC states are able to shape 
the regulatory process in the IMO, the lack of a proper enforcement mechanism also allowed 




them to avoid taking active compliance measures. Specifically, FOC states have neglected their 
responsibility to comply with rules, because they lack the proximity to their registered ships to 
do so. The FOC system frustrated traditional maritime powers to some extent, leading them to 
attempt to compete with FOCs by opening second registries. 
Ensuring compliance may also require institutions and regimes to devote resources to 
enforcement, more than just to making good rules. Mitchell (1994) believes that effective 
regimes have not only effective “primary rules,” but effective “compliance information 
systems,” and “noncompliance response systems.” Put more clearly, rules should be 
unambiguous and clear; compliance should be documented; and noncompliance should have 
consequences adequate to incentivize compliance. In international shipping, the IMO creates 
rules in the form of instruments—Conventions, for example—but fails to incentivize compliance 
because it lacks both a compliance information system and a noncompliance response system. 
Essentially, the IMO has not been able to incentivize compliance or create a way of enforcing its 
instruments.  
1.6 Regionalism 
 The institutional design of the two IOs in international shipping ultimately failed to 
create rules that the regime would comply with. An important part of the regime complex has 
been a regional response to the IOs’ inability to effectively enforce their rules. Conversations 
about regionalism in IR focus on whether regions are more or less effective than international 
efforts or simply reinforce existing power dynamics. Regional organizations, arrangements, and 
agreements are often seen as better alternatives to global efforts on the part of IOs. Others feel 
that regional efforts lead to ideological clashes or power struggles similar to those on the 




international level. Of course, regional efforts are not applied uniformly, and thus results may 
vary. The Paris MOU is known as the strictest, for instance, even though all the other MOUs are 
based on it.  
Regional efforts are sometimes thought of as ways for lesser developed states to pool 
resources to address their collective needs in a way that avoids the influence of dominant or 
hegemonic powers. Kahler (2016) draws attention to the growing role of regional institutions as 
a way for emerging economies such as Brazil, China, and India to express their influence. He 
notes that although regional institutions are sometimes seen as competitive with existing 
formations of global governance, they can also compliment global governance with “the 
contribution of additional resources—financial and organizational—for international ends when 
global institutions are tightly constrained,” while also providing for an international division of 
labor across global efforts (Kahler 20016: p 6). In shipping it is perhaps more helpful to think of 
regional efforts as a response by states with less control over the issue area. In shipping, this 
response came from developed port states which had lost power to FOC states via shipowners 
switching registries to skirt rules. While the IMO failed to produce compliance with rules, the 
Paris MOU was created to combat the use of FOC ships.  
Some contend that arguments about regionalism are merely proxies for broader 
theoretical debates in IR. Thus, different schools of IR provide different valid insights to the 
conversation around regionalism. In Hurrell’s (1995) view, realists stressing the formation of 
regional efforts as responses to a “common enemy or powerful hegemonic power,” are not 
mutually exclusive of liberals explanations about regional efforts as means for realizing 




common goals through cooperative efforts or constructivists’ observations of the interplay 
between actors, structures and ideas that permeate regional efforts.  
Thus, it might be argued that the early phases of regional cooperation may be the result 
of the existence of a common enemy or powerful hegemonic power; but that, having 
been thrown together, different logics begin to develop: the functionalist or problem-
solving logic stressed by institutionalists, or the logic of community highlighted by the 
constructivists (Hurrell 1995: p 358). 
 
 Not all regional efforts are deployed uniformly. Some may compliment international and 
local efforts to address similar issues, while others may conflict. Henning (2016) details how 
regional financial arrangements provide support for the global financial safety net established 
by the G20, although sometimes clashing with global entities like the IMF. Brown (2016) 
suggests that “mega-regional” trade agreements create complications for multilateralism, 
possibly undermining certain irreplaceable functions of the WTO, for instance. Wang (2016) 
describes how the World Bank group can work cooperatively with regional counterparts in the 
New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to partner with private 
capital firms in development projects. In shipping, the regional development of the Paris MOU 
was effective enough that the IMO eventually endorsed it as a de facto enforcement 
mechanism, encouraging other regions to set up similar MOUs modeled after the Paris MOU.  
 Coicaud et al. (2012) argue regional institutions struggle with representing their 
constituent states on the one hand, and the goals of the organization on the other. When 
presented with this tension, they tend to favor the needs of their constituent states, thus 
reinforcing the existing paralysis that causes states to seek international and regional 
organizations in the first place. The tendency toward servicing the interest of states thus 




ensures that regional organizations operate at suboptimal levels. This is not to say that they are 
entirely ineffective, but that they have a tendency to minimize collective interests in favor of 
their constituent states’ interests. In shipping it is much more likely the case that actors 
minimize collective interests in favor of private industry interests, as many actors in shipping 
don’t represent the states they operate out of necessarily.  
Fawcett notes that when talking about regionalism, there is a need for “definitional 
flexibility” that is “multilevel and multi-purpose” and “moves beyond geography and beyond 
states” (2004: p 431). In her view, regions can be thought of not only as clusters of states, but 
groups and zones that share commonality and imagined communities; they can be substate, 
supra-state, and trans-state. Groups in regions can be tight-knit or loosely affiliated and can 
share common or divided identities. In international shipping, regional efforts are conducted 
through MOUs, some of which are confined to a single continent while others span seas.5  
Summary 
 The rest of this thesis draws on ideas from these conversations to evaluate how 
international shipping functions using an IR lens. What is sometimes called “the first global 
industry,” shipping creates issues nearly impassible due to paradigms of state sovereignty. The 
result is the existence of an offshore economy in international shipping which normalizes 
nominal booking of profits and services in states willing to race to the regulatory bottom in 
order to collect rents. Shipping is a massive globalized space that would be difficult to govern 
even with good institutional design features. However, I argue that the international shipping 
 
5 Canada, for instance is a party to the Paris MOU and the Tokyo MOU, yet is not located in either of the 
geographic regions those MOUs are centered in.  




regime complex has peculiar design features, and thus produces suboptimal and inefficient 
outcomes. The institutional design of IOs in shipping affect the outcomes of the regime 
complex—whether good rules are produced and whether they are effective at mitigating 
suboptimal behavior. Whether actors comply with international instruments in shipping is tied 
to actors’ levels of involvement in IOs and the extent to which enforcement mechanisms exist. 
The two IOs in shipping assign authority to states that lack the proximity and incentive to 
enforce their commitments. Enforcement was once close to nonexistent, and still relatively 
weak. Regional efforts attempted to rectify failures in governance at the international level.  
The next chapter will describe how the current era of international shipping developed 
since the beginning of the post war era. It details how two developments created a space that is 
difficult to govern globally. First, it details how the political development of the FOC shipping 
system allowed for peculiar assignment of authority that made shipping difficult to govern. 
Then it explores how the technological development of the container accelerated trade growth 
and globalization, having a compounding effect on the regime’s governance difficulties.   




Chapter 2: Transformations in the Economy of Shipping 
 Although international shipping on the surface mainly exists in the space of private 
business, it is highly political in number of ways. It deals with issues of power, trade, global 
governance, sovereignty, environmental impact, and labor rights, among others. While most 
states develop policies for a limited geographical jurisdiction, shipping exists not only inside 
specific states, but inside multiple states, and outside of all states. Thus, a high level of policy 
coordination is needed in order to effectively govern in the shipping space. Because shipping is 
a space that affects and is affected by almost every state, it is both difficult to coordinate and 
enforce governance in effective and meaningful ways. This chapter explores some of the history 
that shaped the current shipping regime complex, some of the dynamics putting pressure on it, 
and why it is difficult to govern.  
I will argue that two developments, one political and one technological, have 
significantly shaped international shipping as a political space. First, the creation of the Flag of 
Convenience (FOC) system transferred authority over nominally registered fleets to states with 
no genuine link. This incentivized flagging out, and thus created an untenable path to enforcing 
instruments created by the regime complex. Second, the invention of the container acted as a 
force multiplier for international shipping and global trade. The massive growth in shipping 
since the advent of the container has put pressure on the peculiar political design of the regime 
complex.  




2.1 The Beginning of the Modern Shipping Era 
 The practice of flagging out developed slowly, originally as a response to the 
complexities of ships and shipping companies interacting with multiple states and balancing the 
demands of multiple stakeholders.6 Although a few US ships had registered with foreign 
registries in the past, the first significant instance took place as a response to Prohibition. Two 
of the first US ships to flag out, the Resolute and the Reliance, were transferred to the 
Panamanian registry for the explicit purpose of lowering costs and increasing their ability to 
compete with other states’ shipowners. At the time, US flagged ships were legally prohibited 
from allowing the sale or consumption of alcohol onboard and thus suffered a considerable 
competitive disadvantage, as ships at the time carried both cargo and commercial passengers.7 
Additional benefits of the Panamanian registry were realized quickly: shipping companies would 
no longer be bound by US laws to hire their crews exclusively from the US population, and so 
could save massively on crewing costs. “The savings in wages would amount to between 
$17,000 and $18,000 [about $220,000 adjusted to inflation] per month on each vessel, while 
the savings on food would amount to two cents per crew member per day” (Carlisle 1981: p 
17). 
Originally, Panama had not intended to attract foreign shipping companies. However 
the Panamanian registry was an attractive destination for a number of reasons: Panama uses 
the US dollar as its currency, US diplomats such as Alan Dulles had played a big part in shaping 
 
6 The bulk of the information from this subsection was gathered from: Carlisle, Sovereignty for Sale, 1981. This is an 
important book on the topic, and as far as I can tell, one of kind in explaining the FOC system from a historical 
perspective. It is referenced in nearly every political work on the topic.  
7 Passengers could not legally drink on US flagged ships. 




Panamanian policy, and of course because the US played an outsize role in building and 
operating the Panama Canal.8 Because of these factors and more lenient shipping policies, 
Panama was both the most likely acceptable alternate registry to US policy makers—at the time 
shipping companies needed state approval to switch registries—and the most desirable for 
shipowners. It was only with increased use that Panama adjusted its registry in order to attract 
shipowners, by offering “a cheap, convenient, efficient system that left each shipowner free to 
make his own labor policy and to maintain his ship as he saw fit.” (Carlisle 1981: p 37).  
According to Carlisle, the practice grew slowly, mostly because it required political and 
legal justifications to states. Early adopters of flagging out, like ESSO and the United Fruit 
Company, were also early to employ some of the techniques that would come to characterize 
multinational corporations of the second half of the 20th century, such as the use of tax 
avoidance, policy influencing, and currency manipulation. Flagging out was bolstered during the 
US neutrality years before entering WWII, as US shipowners, unable to ship supplies or 
weapons to European states, were rapidly losing business. There was considerable domestic 
debate in the US about whether shipping supplies to European states violated the Neutrality 
Acts, with shipowners arguing that “war hysteria” should not be allowed to disrupt their 
business, while policy makers argued that there was no way to maintain neutrality if the US was 
shipping weapons or supplies to either side. Lawmakers eventually ceded to shipowners, 
allowing them to use the Panamanian registry to bypass “inconvenient” laws in the US. One 
 
8 For a period of time, the largest ships paid homage to the Panama Canal in the name of the ship. Hence the 
Panamax, the Panamax Max, the Post Panamax I, the Post Panamax II, and the New-Panamax. They were named as 
such because, at least in the case of the original Panamax, it was the largest ship that could fit through the Panama 
Canal at the time. It has since been dredged to fit larger and larger ships.  




roadblock to shipping through the Panamanian registry came in the form of repeated German 
attacks on unarmed ships. Panamanian President Arias was opposed to arming ships because 
he believed that he could not rightfully object to their sinking if they were obviously armed to 
defend US companies supplying Allies against German attacks. The issue of Arias’ not allowing 
FOC ships to arm themselves was swiftly resolved by way of military coup.9 
If the Panamanian registry became a FOC slowly and organically, the Liberian registry, by 
contrast, became a FOC by direct design. Edward R. Stettinius Jr., a celebrated businessman and 
statesman10 at the time, had dual interests in Liberia: Liberia was rich with some raw materials 
such as iron and rubber, but also strategically important to the US, as it was a US supported 
sovereign territory. At the time, Liberia was having issues supporting itself, and had accrued 
massive amounts of debt to European lenders.11 Stettinius personally set up a corporation with 
the expressed intention of implementing political, economic and business development in 
Liberia. Stettinius & Associates was run by Stettinius and several former State Department 
officials, as well as businessmen. “Stettinius’s meticulous preparations and extensive 
government contacts ensured that officials from the army, navy, State Department, and CIA 
had participated in the planning” (Cafruny, 1987: p 96). They effectively wrote Liberia’s 
 
9 While Arias was on vacation with his mistress, several of his cabinet members and national guard officers got 
tacit approval from the US: “After checking with Ambassador Wilson to see if the United States would object, they 
announced, October 10, that Arias was deposed on the grounds that he had abandoned the presidency without 
assembly approval” (Carlisle 1981: p 95). 
10 Stettinius previously headed the welfare, labor and public relations duties at General Motors, was chairman of 
the board at US Steel, and a one-time Secretary of State under Franklin D. Roosevelt. 
11 The US interest in Liberia may have also been routed in the state’s historical connection to the US, as the US had 
been sending freed slaves to colonize it through a private interest group with government ties. The American 
Colonialization Society, which was a mixture of white supremacists and others, that believed that African 
Americans would have a more decent life in Africa than in America as freed men. Liberia was founded by a 
coalition of African Americans and African Caribbeans in the 1800s.  




maritime policy and lobbied its passing through Liberia’s legislature. The Liberian Maritime 
Code was drafted in New York and Washington with an eye toward correcting all the issues 
shipowners had working with Panama. Under the new law, recognized internationally, ships 
were to be registered by the International Trust Company in New York, as opposed to through 
state consulates. Importantly, shipowners could be citizens of any state, ship owning 
corporations did not need to incorporate in Liberia, there was no requirement for Liberian 
crewing or inspection of ships, and all laws and transactions were to be written in English.12 
 After World War II, the major maritime powers of the previous era—the UK, France, and 
the Netherlands—were reeling from badly damaged infrastructures, economies, and navies. 
With the China and the USSR focused on developing communist systems internally, the lane 
was open for the US to shape international shipping in the global system. According to Cafruny 
(1985), the US shaped the international shipping space in two important ways. First, it allowed 
the existing regional conference system in liner shipping to continue as a way of ceding some 
power to the previous maritime powers. By allowing conferences to continue, the US fulfilled 
its newly defined role as a global hegemon; it ceded power in return for stability. Second, by 
allowing US shipowners to employ the FOC scheme in bulk cargo shipping, it gave US 
shipowners and shippers an early competitive advantage in post war resource shipping, which it 
would dominate through much of the 20th century.  
 
12 Like Panama, Liberia also used the US dollar as its currency at the time.  




2.2 Liner Shipping 
 Liner shipping is the shipping of finished goods and materials in various in-between 
stages of the supply chain. Such products are shipped along scheduled routes. A liner ship might 
make six to ten stops, loading and unloading various cargo before returning to its home port to 
travel the exact same route again.13 Liner shipping is regulated via a regional conference 
system. Conferences are groups of industry leaders that agree to set prices for the transport of 
specific goods along specific routes to specific ports at specific times. The conference system is 
basically a cabal of stakeholders that determine rates, routes, and which shipowners get which 
contracts, particularly in Europe. Some scholars have argued that conferences display cartel 
behavior (Marx 1953; Fox 1994; Deltas and Konstantinos 2002). Price setting can be somewhat 
complex as it is necessary to consider things such as length of travel, load/unload time, 
refrigeration, security and safety needs.  
In the early decades of the century, most maritime trading occurred either with or 
between European states, which controlled the conferences, and thus the rates, schedules and 
routes for most of the goods shipped via liner shipping. Indeed, conferences have a near 
monopoly on liner shipping and can set whatever rates that they deem fit, regardless of actual 
costs. Some argue that the conference system is basically obsolete now, as it has been 
overwhelmed by non-conference container shipping (Phang and Toh 1994; Damas 1996). 
Another counter argument is that conferences actually allow more competition, as small 
shipping companies can share vessels and terminals, pool resources, coordinate schedules and 
 
13 This is now done by container ship; before it was done by ships with less organized methods for carrying cargo, 
such as boxes, bags, baskets, bushels and piles. 




networks, and make joint investments (Butz 1993). These arguments are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive. Conferences may help more established maritime states’ small shipping 
companies pool resources, for instance, while favoring small companies from European states. 
Nonetheless, conferences represent an early form of industry coordination and control, as well 
as being a locus of power. “Conferences made it possible to rationalize freight markets and 
provided the means by which the leading shipowners, still predominantly British, could protect 
their markets from the predations of new competitors” (Cafruny 1995: 301).  
 Cafruny (1985) argues that although the US had the potential to dominate liner and bulk 
shipping in the post-war era, it made a strategic decision to allow the conference system to 
persist. This was beneficial in a multitude of ways: the system was already well-coordinated, 
and intervening with it may have disrupted an already reeling economy; allowing European 
states to control liner shipping was beneficial for the reconstruction of Western Europe and 
easing the balance of payments crisis. Similarly, allowing Europe to maintain regional power in 
liner shipping was consistent with spirit of global liberalism and interdependence of the post-
war era; and thus, it was in line with the US strategy of global hegemony, particularly in 
economic regulation.  
The existence of European conferences was beneficial to Europe, but it put downward 
pressure on developing states’ attempts to develop their own merchant marines. Roy (1975) 
argues that monopolistic tendencies in European shipping conferences caused a balance of 
payment problem for developing states, where they were not only exporting too much, but not 
earning enough from their exports. The conference system not only created a high barrier for 
entry for developing states, but also a cycle of dependence that was difficult to break: raw 




materials were exported to developed states and finished products were shipped back in. The 
cycle undercut developing states’ ability to create their own merchant marines without pooling 
resources, which put them at a competitive disadvantage to the more established European 
shipowners. According to Mukherjee and Brownrigg (2013), developing states pushed to 
nationalize their ports and shipping industries via the UNCTAD Code on Liner Shipping as a way 
to wrest power, develop healthy trade habits, and earn foreign currency. The shipping 
establishment took a rather blasé attitude to the initiative. One spokesman from the industry 
suggested to the former head of UNCTAD, Adib AL Jadir, that developing states should expand 
into other industrial sectors “more suitable to their abilities” (Cafruny 1987: 235). 
Mukherjee and Brownrigg (2013) find that despite claims that conferences were 
monopolistic, they have actually kept shipping prices relatively low compared to land transport 
systems, which do not operate with the same level of coordination or control. The advent of 
round-the-world shipping (RTW)14 in the 80s caused challenges to the conference system: as 
more non-European economies and shipping lines developed, control over liner shipping would 
become diffuse. Though not zero sum, RTW and the development of developing states’ 
shipping industries sapped power from the cabalistic European shipping conferences. The 
European conference system was accommodating, though criticism of the system persisted in 
the post Cold War era. For instance, James F. Rill, US Antitrust Chief under George H.W. Bush, 
 
14 Round-the-world shipping is a practice where ships make more transoceanic journeys. Some RTW lines travel in 
only one direction stopping at several ports along the way. Others take more phrenetic paths. RTW lines are less 
tethered to specific industries, clients, states, or ports, and thus are less burdened by the conference system.  




said “The regulatory regime created to administer the ocean-shipping industry could hardly be 
more antithetical to economic welfare" (Moskowitz 1992: p 25).  
The power structure of international shipping in the beginning of the post war era was 
driven by two motivations on the part of the US. First, private and government actors had 
developed the practice of FOC bulk shipping through the Panamanian and Liberian registries. 
This allowed US shipping companies to get around complicated dissonance in the regime at the 
time, but also ended up spawning a system that saw the US government cede control to private 
industry in a way that benefitted its own economic development. Second, it was in the US’s 
best interest to allow the European liner conference system to continue and not disrupt the 
existing functional structure of shipping in Europe. This had the additional benefit of helping 
support post war reconstruction in badly damaged Europe. Thus, the US played a significant 
role in shaping the international shipping regime complex after World War II. Its approach to 
shipping was largely hegemonic, as it ceded power to private industry and the European 
conferences system as a way to facilitate greater peace and control.  
2.3 Flags of Convenience 
 FOC state registries offer shipowners and companies cheap registration, low fees, and 
lax regulatory compliance for the ability to collect a small amount of rent. Legally, shipowners 
are allowed to register their ships in any jurisdiction of their choosing. The ships don’t even 
have to ever call at the port of the state they are flagged to.  
By shopping globally, shipowners found that they could choose the laws that were 
applied to them rather than haplessly submitting as ordinary citizens must to the 
arbitrary jurisdictions of their native states. The effect was to lower operating costs—for 
crews and upkeep—and to limit the financial consequences of the occasional foundering 
or loss of a ship (Langewiesche 2003: p 54). 





The arrangement works in a symbiotic fashion, as it benefits both shipowners looking to save 
on costs, as well as developing states looking to collect rents.  
 
The advantages were so great that even the most conservative and well-established 
shipowners, who were perhaps not naturally inclined to play along, found that they had 
no choice but to do so. What's more, because of the registration fees that the 
shipowners could offer to cash-strapped governments, the various flags competed for 
the business, and the deals kept getting better (Langewiesche 2003: p 54). 
 
The FOC system, though contested would become difficult to dismantle, as power in the regime 
complex was siphoned to the two parties that benefit from it: developing states with 
sovereignty and the private businesses that solicit them.  
 
The existence and legitimacy of FOCs are of course a testament to the complexities of 
globalization embedded in international shipping: a ship can be constructed in one state, 
registered in another, managed by a company in third, crewed by a fourth, owned by a citizen 
in fifth—or a group of investors located in multiple states, sold to a company in a sixth that 
specializes in breaking, and reregistered to the state of that company or a seventh before the 
actual breaking. Meanwhile, it may never even port in any of the states it theoretically is 
connected to. When there is an issue with a ship that exists in so many spaces theoretically, 
who is responsible? Gold, gives the examples of ships involved in two major oil spills:  
An example of the degree of globalisation that had been achieved within the industry by 
the late twentieth century, prompted by the availability of Flags of Convenience, is 
provided by the Torrey Canyon disaster in 1967. The ship was owned by a Bermudan-
registered corporation, itself chartered in Liberia. At the time of the accident, the ship 
was under charter to a US corporation that had subchartered the vessel to a British 
company; the master and crew were Italian nationals. In the later case of the Amoco 
Cadiz, the ship had been built in Spain, had US owners, an Italian crew and was carrying 
Arabian crude oil to a Dutch refinery; a West German tug towed the vessel from French 
waters (Gold 1980). 





Although what an appropriate response ought to be is ambiguous, what happens in actuality is 
a somewhat globally cooperative effort. Similar to global financial meltdowns, when structures 
that benefit an isolated group of individuals fail, a global response that involves the actions of 
multiple states—that may or may not have enabled the arrangement—is needed to act on 
behalf of vulnerable and threatened populations.  
 Of course, the institution of sovereignty poses complications to any state or 
organization with intentions to sensibly simplify the current arrangement in shipping. Sovereign 
states necessarily determine their own laws, policies, principles, norms, etc. FOCs may enable 
bad business and labor practices, and lax environmental policies, for example, but to a large 
extent, states don’t have the right to force each other to create or obey their laws without 
opting into international agreements. In this sense, FOCs are justified in creating their 
registration policies. “The debate is problematic since it is not clear how it could be regulated 
without infringing on state sovereignty. There is a strong sense that Flags of Convenience have 
to be lived with and accommodated” (Barton 1999: p 149). 
The literature tempts one to believe that FOCs were set up to deliberately obfuscate 
responsibility and complicate compliance structures, but not all historians agree. The most 
detailed and cited account of the history and formation of FOCs is documented in Carlisle’s 
book Sovereignty for Sale (1981). Interestingly, Carlisle’s account of the formation of FOCs 
differs from most others in that he asserts that their creation was less deliberate and more 
organic, as detailed previously. 




 Alderton and Winchester (2002) similarly argue that shipowners use FOCs as way to 
minimize the relationship between their business practices and any legal or regulatory 
obligations. “These registers are formed in such a way that a path between the flag state and 
the ship owner is, at best, obscure and minimal. Rather than the successful exercise of power 
becoming a problem, it is the possibility of success that is the problem itself” (Alderton and 
Winchester 2002: p 40). They continue to say that claiming sovereignty in one state is a way of 
the negating the sovereignty of another: “The act of sovereignty that is, in part, implied by the 
act of registering a ship, is at the same moment an act of distancing from sovereignty or, to put 
it in another way, the negation of sovereignty is enacted at the moment of its inception” 
(Alderton and Winchester 2002: p 40). 
2.4 Punting Once, Punting Twice 
  US lawmakers had a complicated history with FOCs. On the one hand, FOC shipping 
allowed the US government relief from subsidizing its globally uncompetitive fleet. European 
shippers were more established, more advanced, and more profitable. By flagging out, US 
shipowners were able to make profits independent of subsidization, by allowing ships a 
workable path to offshoring seafarer labor. On the other hand, it came at an enormous cost to 
US workers, as ships flagged in Panama and Liberia had no obligation to employ US crews, and 
thus decimated US seafarer jobs. Protracted investigations in Congress saw conflicting positions 
and arguments fleshed out by shipowners and US workers, but ultimately failed to produce any 
meaningful change to the system. In 1950, the US Maritime Commission adopted the 
terminology “effective United States control” (EUSC) for ships that flag out, and explicitly 
referenced the Liberian Maritime Code. Two years later, the Maritime Administration (which 




became the Department of Commerce) established official guidelines governing the practice of 
EUSC (aka FOC) shipping. Thus, flagging out was allowed by US law. Shipowners could continue 
to sell ships abroad and register them in Panama and Liberia. 
Flagging out became a hot topic in a number of international spaces as well, including 
the United Nations (UN), the International Law Commission (ILC), the International Maritime 
Consulting Organization (IMCO, later to become the IMO), and International Court of Justice 
(ICJ). A massive international labor strike was held in 1958 in protest of FOCs and the 
implications for labor. Opponents of the FOC system argued for an international law that 
required a “genuine link” between ships and shipowners, and the state the ships are allowed to 
register in. Proponents of the FOC system argued that such a strict requirement would violate 
states’ sovereign right to determine their own maritime policy, and further violate the spirit of 
the long held Groatian principle of Mare Liberum.15  
 The first United Nations Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I) was adopted in Geneva in 1958. It 
asserted that there should be a “genuine link” between ships and states but did not provide any 
meaningful explanation for what a genuine link included. The provision that included the 
“genuine link” language was non-binding, because the majority of parties failed to approve the 
right to non-recognition of FOCs. Thus, the legal legitimacy of FOCs was left ambiguous until 
further consideration. In 1960, the ICJ ruled that Liberia could be included in the IMCO because 
“registry was the sole test of nationality for merchant vessels.” This effectively set the 
 
15 Translates to “Freedom of the sea,” a principle in early international law that "Every nation is free to travel to 
every other nation, and to trade with it," requiring a right to innocent passage of the sea. Basically, it’s a 
justification for maintaining anarchy at sea.  




precedent that FOCs were legitimately determined by nominal connection to fleets, and not 
necessarily in any other meaningful way (Cafruny, 1987: p 100). This decision catalyzed a 
massive shifting of bulk tonnage from European maritime powers to US companies and FOCs 
over the next several decades.  
The issue of FOCs was taken up in both the US and in international bodies. The US 
Congress basically punted on the issue in the late 1940s after coming to an impasse when 
deciding whether to side with US workers or US shipowners. The issue was rubber-stamped by 
the US government in 1960 when the US Maritime Commission developed explicit guidelines 
for the practice internationally, and UNCLOS I punted on the issue by acknowledging the 
genuine link language but giving it no explicit meaning in 1958. Then, in 1960 the ICJ ruled in 
favor of FOCs inclusion in the IMCO agreeing that registry constitutes nationality.  
 
Figure 1: Timeline of FOC Legitimation 
The result of both processes—in the US and internationally—was to give legitimacy to 
the practice of flagging out and authority to flag states over nominally registered fleets. That 




authority would be extended to flag states in enforcing the international instruments they 
ratified in the IMO and ILO. This is a peculiar but meaningful distinction because flag states lack 
both the proximity and the political will to enforce these instruments. Thus, the political 
development of legitimizing the practice of flagging out and giving flag states authority over 
nominally registered fleets would shape the international shipping space moving forward.  
2.5 Containerization as a Force Multiplier 
 The second development that would shape the shipping space was technological. The 
invention of the container transformed shipping by making it dramatically more efficient. The 
container allowed for faster, less labor-intensive loading and unloading of ships and allowed for 
the use of intermodal shipping.16 The result was a massive increase in shipping capacity and 
interconnectivity in trade. Essentially, the container helped spur existing trends toward 
interdependent global economic growth.  
The history of containerization is relatively brief, but the effect it has had on 
accelerating the speed of globalization is massive. To be sure, containerization is not the only 
factor affecting the pace of globalization, but it is perhaps more salient than one might imagine. 
Three books give a great summary of the container and its impact on global trade in the second 
half of the 20th century: The Box by Marc Levinson, Box Boats by Brian J. Cudahy, and The Box 
That Changed the World by Arthur Donovan and Joseph Bonney. 
 
16 Intermodality is the transport of freight between different modes of shipping without using handling of any kind. 
Pallets and truck trailers are other examples of intermodality.  




The shipping container is a simple contraption: it is merely a steel or aluminum box 
designed to be easily attached and detached from the frame of a semi-truck or train car.17 The 
reason such a simple device has had such a profound effect on trade growth is that it enabled 
increased intermodality, a concept that became central to transportation logistics. Containers 
could be loaded from ship to train or truck quickly, safely, and without being opened or 
disturbing their cargo, while massively reducing labor and time costs. Before the container, 
cargo had been transported in the crude form of boxes, bushels, bags, and piles. 
Containerization enabled “the fastest growth in economic history ever recorded” (Donovan 
2006: p 209). The container quadrupled the productivity of freight ships. Despite protests and 
strikes on the part of dockworkers, the cost of shipping dropped by a factor of 100 between 
1982 and 2005 as a result of the use of containers (“They Made America”). 
The ability to ship for such lower costs and faster rates drove growth in the size of ships 
needed. Growth begets growth, as they say. The early container ships of the 1950s could hold 
500-800 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEU).18 Steady growth throughout the latter half of the 
20th century saw an increase to ships that could carry as much as 21,000 TEU by 2013 (Rodrigue). 




17 It was the idea of a North Carolinian truck driver named Malcolm MacLean. The container created a paradigm 
shift in the way interstate commerce functions and helped set the course for massive global economic growth. 
Surprisingly, there is very little information recorded about MacLean, let alone a biography of any kind.  
18 A standard container is actually one FEU, or 40-foot equivalent unit, the TEU remains the standard way of 
measuring ship size. So, while shipping capacity is measured in TEU, it is helpful to divide that number by two to 
get a real idea of how many containers are being talked about. There are 20-foot containers as well, but they are 
far less common today. 






Container ships today are outgrowing the old port infrastructure. They are so large that 
the enormous cranes at ports aren’t big enough to load containers across the entire width of 
the ship; the largest ships have deck cranes onboard that move containers from one side to the 
other. Additionally, old ports aren’t deep enough to accommodate the newest largest 
containerships, and in some cases the ports are dredging sea floors to make them up to 50 feet 
deeper in order to accommodate the growth in ships. This can create an increased risk of 
flooding and tidal surge (Morrison 2018). The point of illustrating the trend in ship size growth 
is to draw attention to the fact that this is still a growing industry and that the trend is upward, 
toward larger ships and more trade. Still, there is some question as to whether the growth in 
ship size is actually merited (Merk 2015). Recent years have seen a reduction in overall tonnage 
shipped (Malet 2017). This could be due to China’s economic slowdown and the rise of 
Year Type of Ship Tonnage Capacity 
1956 Early Container Ships 500 – 800 TEU 
1970 Fully Cellular 1,000 – 2,000 TEU 
1980 Panamax 3,000 – 3,400 TEU 
1985 Panamax Max 3,400 – 4,500 TEU 
1988 Post Panamax I 4,000 – 6,000 TEU 
2000 Post Panamax II 6,000 – 8,500 TEU 
2006 Very Large Container Ship 11,000 – 15,000 TEU 
2013 Ultra Large Container Vessel 18,000 – 21,000 TEU 
2020 Ultra Large Container Vessel 24,000 TEU 
Table 1: Ship Type and Carrying Capacity Over Time 
Figure 2: Ship Carrying Capacity Over Time 
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economic tension and protectionist policies, particularly between the US and China (Weisbrot 
2019). Whether annual tonnage trends up or continues to stagnate remains unclear.19 
 Because container shipping is incredibly cost effective20 containerization opened new 
doors for increasing supply chain complexity. Economies of scale mean that minor cost 
reductions scaled up become massively significant. Cheaper transportation costs mean that 
firms can reap the benefit of increasingly complex manufacturing specialization. According to 
George, for instance, “Shipping is so cheap that it makes more financial sense for Scottish cod 
to be sent ten thousand miles to China to be filleted, then sent back to Scottish shops and 
restaurants, than to pay Scottish filleters.” (2013: p 18). Massey (1984) described how 
globalization enabled the specialization of the geography of production. That is, how capital 
determines how and where specific production processes will take place in the most efficient 
way possible. This concept can be readily observed in shipping. UNCTAD reports neatly 
illustrate which states and regions specialize in ownership, financing, registration, crewing, 
building, and breaking (UNCTAD 2018 pg 76). The increasing complexity of certain consumer 
goods then relies on the continued and growing use of shipping simple items across oceans and 
back several times for minor savings and values-added multiplied several times over. Different 
parts of the manufacturing process of complex goods like cars and consumer electronics are 
performed at different sites, in different cities, and even on different continents. Different 
minerals and metals can be mined in Africa, South America, or both and sent to China for 
manufacturing before arriving in the US for instance. Because supply chain lengthening leads to 
 
19 The Covid 19 pandemic will also have a massive effect on growth and international shipping, as it is slowing 
down economies across the world. See Paris. 
20 According to George (2013) It costs 1 cent to ship a can of beer across an ocean, for instance. 




more international shipping, it also implies increased burdens on labor and the environment. 
The next chapter will look at issues that are exacerbated by the two important developments in 
shipping described in this chapter.  
Summary 
 I have argued that two developments, one political and one technological, have 
significantly shaped international shipping as a political space. First, the creation of the FOC 
system transferred authority over nominally registered fleets to states with no genuine link. 
Through the course of the mid 20th century, shipowners would gradually and increasingly shift 
their registration to states they did not have any genuine link to in order save on costs. This led 
to a transformation of the structure and location of power over time. As a result, FOCs 
developed the largest fleets. Second, the invention of the shipping container acted as a force 
multiplier for the growth of trade and globalization. This growth was reflected in a rapid scaling 
up of ship size and economic specialization. The ability to ship massive amounts of goods 
transformed the world economy rapidly. These two developments have implications for some 
important issues in international shipping.  
The next chapter will explore three categories of issues that bear immense pressure 
because of the developments described in this chapter. Because shipping is a huge industry that 
ties the world economy together, and because authority over nominal fleets is peculiarly 
located in flag states, the international shipping regime complex struggles to optimally regulate 
labor, environmental, and security issues.  
  




Chapter 3: Issues in International Shipping 
 In the last chapter, I argued that two developments shaped the international shipping 
space in a way that made it difficult to govern. This chapter describes some of the issues that 
international shipping has struggled to govern. Issues in international shipping fall into three 
broad categories: labor issues, environmental issues and security issues. Each pose unique 
problems that are not addressed in equal ways. First, labor issues are problematically attributed 
because they largely happen between ports, on the open sea. Although flag states are 
responsible for enforcing the instruments they ratify, all states lack the proximity to employ any 
sort of oversight or enforcement mechanism when ships are between ports. Second, 
environmental issues suffer a similar set of problems: much of ships’ contribution to pollution 
occurs where it is difficult to assign responsibility: in international waters, or between ports, or 
after ships are reregistered for breaking. Prominent international efforts have either deferred 
to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) or punted on attempting to make 
environmental rules for international shipping. Third, security issues occur as a result of the 
activities of various non-state actors such as pirates, terrorists, black marketeers and human 
traffickers. Finally, a fourth issue is temporal: the lifecycle of a ship creates a synchronization 
issue for the rollout and application of attempts to govern these issues. Put another way, the 
massive increase in trade volume is out of synch with the slow lifecycle of ships. This in turn has 
exacerbated the regime complex’s inability to optimally govern in international shipping.  
3.1 Labor Issues 
 The practice of flagging out presents challenges for international labor law. There is a 
diffusion of responsibility regarding seafarers’ rights. When labor issues occur, it is not always 




clear where seafarers should turn—their home state, the shipowner’s home state, the state the 
shipping company is incorporated in, the next port state? Again, the flag state is responsible, 
which implies a conflict of interest, as the Flag of Convenience (FOC) states’ model is essentially 
a business strategy to keep costs for shipowners low by requiring the bare minimum regarding 
regulatory compliance. In other words, it is in their best interest to retain business, not fight for 
the rights of the seafarers, at least as far as the FOC can preserve a decent reputation. 
“Seafarers under FOC have lost their rights as citizens of homelands. They come under flag state 
laws on the high seas, which, if they are protective, can be conveniently ignored” (Couper 1999: 
p 170).  
The conditions of work for seafaring vary by employer but are generally rough. Issues 
include long work hours, lack of leave, long periods of time away from loved ones, unsanitary 
work conditions, physical and mental abuse, ship abandonment, and human rights abuses.21 It 
can be difficult for seafarers to distinguish between work and recreation, as they don’t often 
truly leave their work environment, have work shifts at all hours of the day, and are often on 
call even when they are not working. The lack of demarcation along with fluctuating rough 
weather conditions and labor-intensive activities is known to wear on seafarers’ psyches and 
cause fatigue. “Noise, vibration, environmental conditions, voyage cycle, port calls, cargo 
handling and other activities of the modern shipping business can all reduce the ability of the 
seafarer to gain quality sleep and rest” (Exarchopoulos et al. 2018: p 63). For seafarers, there is 
 
21 A recent article (Apuzzo and Gebrekidan 2020) related to the Covid 19 pandemic documents how seafarers were 
forced to continue working aboard ships past their contracts, or worse yet, stranded on foreign shores with no way 
to get home as a result of the virus.  




little guarantee of the quality of conditions from voyage to voyage, as captains and crew are 
shuffled around and switched out at port stops, working conditions also tend to vary.  
 FOC states often fail to address issues, even sometimes refusing to make shipowners 
pay seafarers. When this happens, seafarers can work through the International Transit 
Workers Federation (ITF) to try to recoup lost wages. It can take months to recover wages, and 
seafarers have little choice but to continue working in shipping or face abandonment. “Without 
their salaries … they remain captive to these immoral employers.” (Exarchopoulos et al. 2018: p 
63). The practice of seafarer abandonment is far too common. According to the IMO, as of 
January 2019 “there were 366 abandonment incidents listed in the database since it was 
established in 2004, affecting 4,866 seafarers. Of those incidents, 175 cases were resolved, 77 
cases were disputed and 52 cases were inactive. There were still 52 unresolved cases.”22 Ships 
get abandoned either when ship owning companies run into financial trouble, or simply decide 
not to pay their employees. When abandonment happens, crews are often left with few 
options: stay with the ship until their dispute is resolved or leave the ship and lose their ability 
to collect wages. Either option likely leaves them stuck in unfamiliar land, with an unknown 
path forward. In one case, a crew of seafarers spent 18 months on board a ship off the coast of 
the United Arab Emirates (UAE) waiting for a resolution (McVeigh 2019). 
 Shipbuilding and shipbreaking are also labor intensive and dangerous activities. The 
global distribution of labor assures that these activities happen in specialized, cost effective 
spaces. Even as the number of ships ordered has grown, the number of yards accepting orders 
 
22 “Seafarer Abandonment” The International Maritime Organization, 
www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Legal/Pages/Seafarer-abandonment.aspx. Accessed 3/1/2020 




has shrunk, indicating further concentration of shipbuilding activities in certain states (Gogic 
2019). Some of these states, such as China, have particularly egregious human rights records, 
making it problematic that such dangerous work is concentrated within them. A scene in the 
documentary film Manufactured Landscapes shows a Chinese Man working without a mask, 
using a tool that is actively propelling white sparks into his face (Baichwal 2007). In the case of 
shipbreaking, ships are reregistered in open registry states that specialize in capturing rent from 
shipbreaking.23 The vast majority of shipbreaking happens on the Indian subcontinent, in India, 
Pakistan and Bangladesh. One of the reasons these states capture shipbreaking rents, is their 
lax regulation in labor laws and allowance for the practice of “beaching”—breaking ships on the 
beach partially submerged, as opposed to on land where chemical seepage can be better 
controlled. Shipbreaking “is among the most dangerous of occupations, with high levels of 
casualties, injuries and work-linked diseases” (Alcaeida et al 2016: p 378-9), including cancer 
related to asbestos (Wu et al. 2015). One step in shipbreaking requires removing leftover fuel 
and fuel residue, a brutally toxic and dangerous process that sometimes sees young 
Bangladeshi men standing neck-deep in oil to do their work (Baichwal 2007). 
3.2 Environmental Issues 
 There is no doubt that ships have a tremendous impact on the environment. Especially 
of concern is the type of fuel that ships use. Ships use a particular form of low-grade fuel called 
“bunker fuel”—which is basically a byproduct of oil distillation for other fuel sources. Bunker 
fuel has several thousand times the sulphur content of the diesel fuel that cars use. Although 
 
23 Alceida et al. use the term “mirror flags,” because the process of reflagging for shipbreaking further obscures 
ship ownership through a series of complicated transactions.  




ships produce a relatively small amount of carbon dioxide,24 they produce high amounts of 
sulphur oxide and nitrogen oxide. At least some research suggests high levels of both sulphur 
oxide and nitrogen oxide are linked to increased instances of lung disease and increased 
respiratory issues among other serious health ailments (Nicholic et al. 2001; Lee et al. 2002; 
Nafstad et al. 2003). “Just 16 of the world’s largest ships produce as much lung-clogging sulphur 
as all the world’s cars” (Zanne and Twrdy 2011: p 102). High sulfur content in the air is known 
to cause acid rain (Carter 1979). The pollution that ships produce increases faster than other 
forms of transportation. “This is due to the more stringent emission standards and fuel 
specifications for road transport, railway traffic and inland navigation, and due to the slow 
turnover of sea vessel technologies” (Schrooten 2008: p 668). 
Part of the problem with maritime emissions is attribution. Much of the emissions occur 
in international waters and are emitted from ships that are geographically hard to assign for 
reasons central to this thesis. Until at least 2005, emissions where assigned to the states that 
sold fuel, not the states responsible for the ships. Thus, a lot of pollution was not measured 
accurately. The Kyoto Protocol made no emissions targets for ships, instead reserving that duty 
for the IMO. The International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) also measures emissions based 
on fuel sold. The Paris Climate Accord doesn’t address the shipping industry at all. There have 
been several efforts to research, assess, and assign blame for pollution, as well as create targets 
for greenhouse gas emissions improvements. None of these, however, have any sort of binding 
or enforcement mechanism. Additionally, there has been pushback from fuel producers, 
 
24 1.5-3% of global CO2 emissions. (Zanne and Twrdy 2011) 




arguing that changing their production processes would be both expensive, and ironically, push 
their factories over emissions standards (Kanter 2008). Thus far, environmental issues in 
shipping have been left exclusively in the purview of the regime’s international organizations 
(IOs), which have issues that will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Another issue deals with ballast water discharge. Ballast water is water that is held in 
the bottom of ships in order to provide stability and prevent capsizing. Ballast water is cycled in 
and out during port visits, resulting in discharging non-native biodiversity, including plants 
animals, bacteria and viruses.25 Ballast water discharge can cause serious ecological damage 
and human health problems. Until the Ballast Water Management Convention in 2017 was 
created in the IMO, there was no coordinated international regulation regarding ballast water 
discharge.  
Oil spills are a perennial concern as 
well. Besides rare high-profile oil spills such 
as the Exxon Valdez spill in 1989, most oil 
spills are not major news stories because 
they happen in international water or parts 
of the world large audiences aren’t 
interested in.26 Though oil spills have 
trended considerably downward over the 
 
25 This includes both exotic and invasive species.  
26 The Exxon Valdez, which resulted in a spill of 37k tons of oil, barely cracks the IOPTFs top 20 largest oil spills 
since its inception after the Torrey Canyon Incident in 1968.  
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last 50 years, the numbers are still astonishing. Counting only “large” oil spills, there were 245 
in the 1970s, 94 in the 1980s, 77 in the 1990s, 32 in the 2000s, and 18 in the 2010s based on 
numbers provided by the Interagency Ocean Policy Task Force (IOPTF). 
The practice of shipbreaking also has implications for environmental damage. Ships are 
primarily broken in states that allow beaching, which results in uncontrollable seeping of toxic 
substances into the marine environment:  
Contaminants and pollutants from SBRIs27 using the open beaching method in India, 
Pakistan, and Bangladesh are almost invariably released untreated into the coastal 
environment, from which they can migrate to the marine environment. The magnitude 
of the resulting environmental impacts is often ignored, due not only to lack of 
awareness, but also to the inability to manage and monitor these pollutants (Barua et al. 
2018: p 30884) 
There are safer ways to recycle ships, but they have significantly higher costs. Thus, states that 
allow the open beaching method capture the vast majority of the market. 
3.3 Security Issues 
Issues of security became a chief concern in the US after 9/11, when it was realized that 
global infrastructure was uniquely vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Ports were found to be 
completely lacking in their ability to efficiently inspect cargo for terrorist threats. In the US, the 
inspection system was so convoluted that it wasn’t clear where cargo “entered” the US, and 
which agencies controlled which security aspects related to it. According to Flynn, “The U.S. 
Customs Service inspection system is built around clearing cargo not at its arrival port but at its 
final destination (confusingly known as the "port of entry," referring to the point at which 
goods enter the U.S. economy)” (Flynn 2002: p 65). The period between when containers reach 
 
27 SBRI stands for shipbreaking and recycling industry.  




the ports and their “port of entry” can be as long as 30 days. The responsibility of recognizing 
suspicious ships or cargo was so diffuse that it involved multiple government agencies—the 
Coast Guard, U.S. Customs, FBI, CIA, INS etc.—with different protocols and different means of 
reporting (the U.S. Customs Service was still “struggling with paper based services” at the time 
of Flynn’s article, in 2002). A decade later, capabilities were still lagging. Two systems explored 
by Bakshi et al. (2011), for instance, scan containers for radioactivity; but radioactivity is 
obviously not the only possible method of attack, and such scanners would not detect all sorts 
of other illicit materials or trafficking of people. In a world reeling from the terrorist attacks of 
9/11, these insights created feelings of fear and vulnerability.  
Another recurring concern is piracy, especially off the horn of Africa. The phenomenon 
of Somali pirates hijacking and ransoming ships has its roots in the inability of the Somali state 
to govern its waters against illegal foreign fishing boats. A slew of illegal actions, including 
foreign fishing and waste dumping in Somalia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), prompted 
Somali citizens to enact “ecosystem justice” by taking over and ransoming foreign ships 
(Sumaila and Bawumia 2014)). The practice quickly metastasized into one of vigilante justice, 
affecting the legal transfer of resources, namely oil from the Persian Gulf. The Somali 
government failed to police pirates in its waters, not by choice, but because the state lacked 
the capacity to deal with the issue as it developed over time. This has significantly increased the 
cost and risk associated with shipping in the Indian Ocean. The price pirates demand when 
ransoming oil tankers increased from $150,000 in 2005 to $5.4 million in 2010. Pira Energy Corp 
calculated the added cost at around 40 cents/barrel of oil. That may seem like a trivial 
amount—especially since the price of a barrel of oil can exceed $100 when oil is scarce—but for 




a supertanker carrying two million barrels, that amounts to $800k of added costs per vessel 
(Holmes 2011). Although illicit, piracy is one of the largest industries in Somalia and significantly 
hampers its ability to collect taxes, fund its coast guard, and thus enforce its international duty 
to stop piracy in its waters. Jablonski and Oliver (2013) liken this relationship to the resource 
curse: essentially the primacy of an illicit industry limits the state’s prospects for growth, 
development and legitimacy. A lack of stability and the inability to collect taxes on the illicit 
activity undermine the ability of the state to create the necessary stability to promote 
economic dynamism that ultimately leads to healthy growth (Kimenyi 2010). Thus, a sort of 
feedback loop is created, where the most profitable industry persists because the state lacks 
the capacity to police it, while the state’s capacity lacks the ability to grow because it cannot tax 
the illicit industry.  
 This in turn creates a collective action problem: Somalia can’t effectively control its 
piracy issue, but much of the world depends on the safe passage of oil through its waters. In 
fact, Somalia may be incentivized to not intervene, as intervening negatively affects one of its 
most profitable industries that benefits its greater economy 
The number of people that rely on the maritime piracy industry in Somalia has snow-
balled dramatically to include the families and friends of pirates, officials and other 
members of society receiving bribes, their families, as well as the warlords and 
organised crime bosses themselves. (Otto 2011: p 47).  
 
For this reason, Somalia may be loath to intervene. In the absence of sufficient action, groups of 
transnational organizations28 within the international shipping regime complex have called on 
 
28 “On 29 September 2008, the international shipping industry, represented by the Baltic and International 
Maritime Council (BIMCO), the International Chamber of Shipping and International Shipping Federation (ICS/ISF), 
the International Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners (INTERCARGO), the International Association of 
Independent Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO), and the International Transport Workers' Federation, issued a joint 
 




the developed states to take action (Kashubsky 2008). The UN has responded by allowing states 
with no jurisdiction to take all means necessary to counter piracy, including the establishment 
of a task force of mostly developed states that patrol Somali waters (Weir 2012). Thus, the 
uninterrupted flow of resources increasingly demands cooperation on the part of developed 
states that do not have any international legal obligation or authority to protect the safe 
passage of goods through the waters of a developing—sometimes derisively referred to as 
failed (Sium 2012)—state that lacks the ability or incentive to fulfill its international legal 
obligation. 
3.4 Temporal Issues 
With the three preceding issues, time plays a compounding roll in the regime complex’s 
difficulty in governing international shipping.  
Shipping is today an integrated constituent of global supply chains, so marine 
transportation is constantly under pressure to contribute to its nuances of cost, time 
compression, reliability, standardisation, just-in-time delivery, information system 
support, flexibility, customisation etc. (Maritime Gateway 2014: p NA).  
In an era when new cars and computer chips are designed to last two years, clothing is 
designed to last less than a season,29 and oil is consumed almost as soon as it leaves the pump, 
the ships that carry raw materials and consumer goods are generally built to last 20 to 30 
years.30 The lifecycle of ships is thus out of sync with many other global trends, even those that 
 
statement in which they called on the governments to take action to address the piracy problem in Somalia and 
the Gulf of Aden.” (Kashubsky 2008: p 31) 
29 Short term leases on new cars are generally 24-36 months; Moore’s law accurately predicted the doubling of 
processor speed every two years; “Fast fashion” clothes go from the catwalk to the closet to the garbage often in a  
season or less.  
30 This is a rough estimate. See http://www.shippipedia.com/life-cycle-of-a-ship/ Ships are designed for different 
purposes and have different life spans. See For instance, Dong and Wei note that even the Panamax can be 
designed for two different purposes, having a lifespan of either 20 or 30 years.  




shipping has perpetuated. Ships are built to last, but long lifecycles have implications for 
outdated efficiency and technology. “The average age of the world merchant fleet is about 12.5 
years, compared to only 7 years for heavy trucks,” for example (Schrooten 2008: p 668). It 
follows that new technology takes much longer to spread through the shipping ecosystem than 
others. This means that new regulations to regulate sulfur emissions, for instance, require old 
ships to be retrofitted with new technology.31 Building and retrofitting ships is expensive and 
time-consuming, and the regulatory environment in shipping is slow to anticipate and react to 
issues. Meanwhile, the process for building ships is time-consuming, but the demand for new 
ships is vulnerable to developments in trade. “While ships themselves may take more than five 
years to finance, design and build and forward planning is crucial to their commercial success, 
routes, security of charter and prospect of profit can disappear with the announcement of a 
grain embargo or an oil price rise” (Cragg 70). Thus, a lot of human capital can be wasted in the 
process of building ships by sudden swings in commodity prices and trade trends.  
 For labor issues, the long lifecycle of ships affects seafarers because older ships might be 
slower to take up new technology. The older ships are, the less likely they are to have 
converted to modern technology, and thus seafarers aboard older ships may have to work 
harder and in more dangerous environments. Seafarers can be forced to use old equipment 
that is not safe to use by modern standards, which poses significant risk to their safety. 
Occupational mortality of seafarers is already unusually high compared to other occupations 
 
31 In the case of new sulfur regulations, old ships are being fitted with “scrubbers,” devices designed to clean ship 
emissions. 
32 Interestingly, a dip in fuel cost has led shipowners to spend less on cleaner fuel, leading to a “redundancy” in 
retrofitting old ships with scrubbers. This suggests another way in which time is at odds with issues in shipping. See 
Weise Bockman, “Dry Bulk”.  




(Oldenberg et al. 2016; Roberts and Marlow 2005), so the increased risk is significant. They can 
also be subject to higher levels of pollution, with implications for their health (Hansen et al 
2005). Because ships are such massive economic investments and they stay in circulation for 
much longer periods of time than other technologies, seafarers’ risks are naturally mitigated—
through the advent of safer technology becoming standard on newer ships—less, relative to 
other occupations.  
Environmental issues are affected by time in similar ways. New technology is taken up 
slower throughout the world fleet because of the long lifecycle of ships. The pace at which new 
environmental concerns are being recognized and the speed at which anthropogenic climate 
change is occurring seem to be accelerating. Meanwhile the regime complex is slow to react, 
with international instruments taking years to materialize and become binding, and technology 
taking years to precipitate through the world fleet. New ships take time to build, and old ships 
need to be retrofitted with new technology, which can be expensive. Retrofitted technology is 
not always checked for secondary effects before installation, either. In the case of scrubbers,—
devices that mitigate toxic emissions—for instance, old ships were retrofitted with the new 
technology without proper risk analysis. Research after the fact has shown that while scrubbers 
clean sulfur oxide emissions, they also result in high copper and zinc surface water deposits, 
effectively replacing one problem with another (Turner et al. 2017).32 Meanwhile a shift in the 
price of fuel, something that changes much faster and more fluidly than the design capabilities 
of ships, can negate the purpose of installing new technology in the first place (Weise Bockman 
 
32 Interestingly, a dip in fuel cost has led shipowners to spend less on cleaner fuel, leading to a “redundancy” in 
retrofitting old ships with scrubbers. This suggests another way in which time is at odds with issues in shipping. See 
Weise Bockman, “Dry Bulk”.  




2020). The long lifecycle of ships also has implications for the toxic practice of shipbreaking. The 
market for shipbreaking continues to grow during stalled periods in shipping, because 
shipbreaking demand reacts to ships coming out of the shipping ecosystem, which they likely 
had entered 25-30 years prior.  
The tonnages of recycled ships have grown three fold during the past years, owing to 
the rise in supply of end-of-life vessels due to global slowdown in the market. As per the 
ship recycling statistics, it is clear that the world's maritime community will have to 
scrap 10 to 15 million tons [of] obsolete vessels every year for at least coming 10 years. 
(Hiremath et al. 2015: p 520-1) 
 
Just as the environmental impact of the cars of the midcentury are just now starting to be 
realized, the impact of ships is not fully realized until they reach their final destination, beached 
on the Indian subcontinent, slowly polluting the ocean environment.  
 Regarding security issues, the main compounding temporal aspect is the rapidly 
escalating growth in volume. While loading and unloading has evolved to become maximally 
efficient, the ability to inspect cargo lags behind considerably. According to Flynn (2002), 
although a thorough container check took five inspectors three hours, the realistic amount of 
time inspectors had to inspect a ship based on the volume entering the ports at the time was 
roughly two minutes. There is simply not enough time to check all cargo for all security threats. 
Even with advanced tracking and x-ray technology, checking every container and every bulk 
ship would cause significant supply chain delays that would impact multiple sectors of multiple 
economies, likely resulting in shortages in vital resources. The implication is that all illicit 
activities—terrorist attacks, drug smuggling, and human trafficking—are simple to conduct 
without detection through shipping.  





  In this chapter I have detailed some of the issues that have arisen in international 
shipping. Issues in international shipping fall into three main categories: labor, environmental, 
and security. All three categories of issues are difficult to govern because of much of the activity 
in question happens between ports, where there is little or no oversight or enforcement. In 
most cases, the responsibility to enforce international instruments is assigned to states that 
lack the proximity to do so. This peculiar assignment of authority clearly makes enforcing 
international instruments inefficient and thus leads to suboptimal outcomes. All three 
categories of issues are compounded by time. The lifecycle of ships is out of sync with the 
speed of technological progress, which has implications for labor issues and environmental 
issues especially. The speed and efficiency required in loading and offloading at ports makes 
security enforcement nearly impossible. 
The next chapter will map out the international shipping regime complex. It is important 
to identify the different actors in play, and how they interact and govern in the international 
shipping space. I will identify what I will argue are the two most important sources of authority 
in the international regime complex: the International Maritime Organization and Port State 
Control. Then I will discuss how the complexity of the regime creates suboptimal and inefficient 
outcomes.  
  




Chapter 4: Mapping the Regime Complex 
 As made clear in the previous chapter, the international shipping regime complex is 
presented with many issues that are difficult to govern by virtue of its global character and 
peculiar assignment of authority, and compounded by exploding growth facilitated by the 
invention of containerized shipping. Another reason it is so difficult to govern and is that it 
involves so many different actors. What exists is a conglomeration of myriad actors—states, 
IOs, NGOs, private industry stakeholders—operating in multiple often overlapping governing 
spaces within international shipping. The existence of complexity within the regime causes 
incoherence and confusion in terms of legitimacy.  
There is a proliferation of international and national associations, which results in too 
many bodies and needless overlaps in terms of their functions and activities. The 
existence of multiple voices, often saying similar things but with minor differences can 
have the very damaging consequences of confusing the maritime message in the minds 
of governments, politicians and other observers of our industry. It makes it clear that 
the industry just can’t ‘get it together.’ (Mukherjee 2013: p 345-6) 
  It is my contention that what exists constitutes not merely a regime, but a regime 
complex, or the existence of “nested, partially overlapping, and parallel international regimes 
that are not hierarchically ordered.” (Alter and Meunier 2009: p 13). This chapter illustrates 
regime complexity in international shipping by describing the many actors and the mechanisms 
that attempt to regulate the regime. Mapping the regime complex is critical to understanding 
why it is so difficult to govern in international shipping. Additionally, it identifies two 
contrasting pressure points that will be studied in further detail in the next two chapters. The 
first pressure point is the two international organizations (IOs)—the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) and the International Labor Organization (ILO)—which have the authority to 




make rules. The second pressure point is Port State Control (PSC), which has the ability to 
enforce those rules on ships and shipowners within the regime complex.  
4.1 Meet the Actors 
States 
States have a lot of power in the international shipping space, mostly because they have the 
sovereignty to develop their own policies regarding shipping, shipbuilding and labor. Their 
behavior is constrained and governed to the extent that they are bound by and comply with 
international instruments, but they also have the ability to set agendas and shape discussions. 
States fall into three categories: flag states, port states, and coastal states. 
Flag States: Flag states are the most important actors in the regime complex. All ships must be 
registered to a specific flag, and the flag state is responsible for enforcing international 
instruments. Flag states come in the form of closed registries, open registries and second 
registries, which will be discussed below. 
Port States: Although flag states are technically responsible for upholding the standards set by 
the international shipping regime complex, the reality is that many flag states, particularly Flag 
of Convenience (FOC) states, lack the resources, motivation and/or proximity to do so. Because 
of this, it is left for port states to enforce international instruments determined by the regime 
complex.  
Coastal States: All coastal states where ports are located are members of the main multilateral 
governance body, the IMO, and have voting power in the IMO Assembly. The leverage of these 
votes vary in terms of the amount of Deadweight Tonnage (DWT) each state registers. 




Additionally, the extent to which each state is vested in issues varies to some extent based on 
how many ports they control, how much DWT they register, and how reliant they are on 
importing/exporting.  
Registries 
Closed Registries: Also known as “National Registries,” are agencies, usually run by flag states, 
that require shipowners and shipping companies to be based in or operate out of their state in 
order to register ships there. These are mostly based in Traditional Maritime Countries (TMC)—
states that specialized in shipping before the current era of shipping and the beginning of the 
FOC system.  
Open Registries: Open registries are states that allow any shipowner or shipping company to 
register ships with them. These can be—but aren’t necessarily—FOCs. FOC states particularly 
wield power because they control a much higher amount and percentage of global DWT than 
other states, and thus are more vested in issues and have more power in the IMO. Open 
registries can be publicly or privately operated. In some cases, state governments operate their 
own registries. In other cases, states contract the management of their registries out to 
classification societies (CSs). 
Second Registries: Second registries were a creation of European states with the intention of 
deterring shipowners from flagging out. The UK has a second registry based out of the Isle of 
Man, France has one based in the Kerguelen Islands, and Norway, Denmark, Germany and 
Spain all have “national registries” which are just second registries (Sornn-Freisse 2014). Their 
registration requirements are similar to the closed registries they are associated with, but rules 




and enforcement are lax and erode over time (Toh and Phang 1993; Desombre 2008). Ship 
owners in national registries register in second registries for a narrow comparative advantage in 
operating costs, and the security of their genuine flag state. These have proven to have a 
limited amount of success in retaining rents by keeping domestically based shipowners from 
flagging out, though for some states more than others (Yin et al. 2018).  
International Organizations 
International Maritime Organization (IMO): The IMO is the main international organization 
where states and different actors that represent them interact and coordinate on policy 
matters. It has an Assembly that meets once a year that is composed of all member states, 
which include most states of the UN, because most states have ports, coastal territory, or 
shipping registries. In addition, it has a 40-member Council that meets twice a year. Although 
the IMO Council is not considered its highest body, it arguably has the most power of the three 
bodies in the IMO because it sets the agenda of the Assembly and nominates the Secretary 
General. The next chapter will describe the IMO in more detail.  
International Labor Organization (ILO): The ILO was originally a League of Nations institution 
but came under the purview of the UN after World War II. The ILO coordinates states, 
employers, and workers to develop labor policies internationally. The tripartite power 
structure—each of the aforementioned three actors have a third of the vote—is unique to the 
ILO. Additionally, the ILO operates in the shipping space by developing guidelines for PSC that 
are used by members of the International Transit Workers Federation (ITF) at ports to ensure 
that ships are following international labor instruments developed by the ILO.  





United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD): UNCTAD’s role in the regime 
complex is primarily serving the needs of developing states. In 1972, UNCTAD created a Code of 
Conduct for the Liner Conference System (otherwise known as the UNCTAD Liner Code) that 
pushed to open up the conference system in Europe to states that trade with Europe, which 
was intended to help developing states join the European conferences. The UN General 
Assembly made a similar effort to open the conference system with the passage of Treaty No. 
22380, though the treaty was seldom enforced, and eventually mooted by non-conference 
container ships (Phang and Toh 1994). UNCTAD currently develops annual reports with vital 
statistics on registration, ownership, connectivity etc.  
Transnational Organizations 
There are number of transnational organizations including NGOs and industry groups that 
operate in the international shipping regime complex in various ways, including performing 
research, advising and representing IMO members, and observing IMO meetings.  
International Transport Workers Federation (ITF): The ITF is an international federation of 
unions that work on ships and in ports. It is a quasi-international organization, as it brings 
together dockworkers transnationally but is not affiliated with state governments. The ITF 
determines which states are considered FOCs and keeps a list on their website. They make sure 
that all states follow general rules of conduct by boarding ships, checking certificates, and 
informing seafarers of their rights. The ITF played a key advisory role in establishing the ILO 




Maritime Safety Convention, which includes a seafarer’s bill of rights drafted by the ITF.33 They 
also help implement PSC at the ports, and in this way can put a considerable amount of 
pressure on shipowner behavior, and increase the bargaining power of dockworkers. According 
to an article in the Economist, “ITF has come close to imposing a worldwide minimum wage ten 
times higher than some local rates” (Economist 1997: p 75). 
World Shipping Council (WSC): The WSC is a liner industry lobbying group that represents all of 
the world’s largest liner shipping companies—AP Møller-Maersk , COSCO, Evergreen Marine, 
Hapag Lloyd etc.—and 90% of the world’s liner shipping capacity. The group includes all of the 
top ten liner shipping companies and many others. The WSC lobbies IOs and national 
governments regarding maritime policies related to security, port regulations, customs 
procedures, and international shipping standards. Their stated purpose is to play “an active role 
in the development of programs that improve maritime security without impeding the free flow 
of commerce.”34 
International Chamber of Shipping (ICS): The ICS is a large international trade association that 
represents shipowners and operators in all sectors of shipping. The ICS represents about 80% of 
the world’s DWT and runs parallel functions to the IMO in development of the industry’s 
advisory strategies for the IMO. They have special consultative status with the IMO, and other 
IOs dedicated to trade such as UNCTAD and the World Customs Organization. ICS acts as a 
parallel body to other IOs to coordinate private industry leaders’ positions on important issues.  
 
33 https://www.mlc-2006.eu/website/user_content/documents/SEAFARERS%20BILL%20OF%20RIGHTS.pdf 
34 See http://www.worldshipping.org/about-the-council 




Classification Societies (CSs): CSs are industry groups—sometimes private, other times state-
sponsored—that establish and maintain technical specifications and set labor and pollution 
standards for ship operating and shipbuilding. Many states have national CSs, but other states 
contract their registry management out to privately operated CSs. The latter is particularly 
common with FOC states, which generally lack the resources to manage their massive fleets. 
Before PSC was implemented, CSs were the primary location of enforcement of international 
standards on ships that flagged out.35 
International Association of Classification Societies (IACS): The IACS is a group of 12 CSs that 
classify over 90% of the world’s DWT. IACS establishes technical, safety and environmental 
standards. It creates its own mechanisms for certification and compliance and is a principal 
technical advisor to the IMO. Essentially, IACS coordinates CSs operations in managing state 
fleets, particularly FOC fleets as they outsource this function to CSs. Because it is a principal 
technical advisor at the IMO, it helps advise on the creation of instruments that its constituents 
adhere to.  
Consultative Shipping Group (CSG): A group of 18 mostly Western36 states that lobbies for open 




35 Lloyd’s Register in the UK was the first, dating back to 1760, and remains the most prominent. Lloyd’s DWT 
measurements are what the IMO bases its assessed contributions on.  
36 European, Asian, and Canada. 





Transnational Organizations Who does it represent? Primary Function 
International Transport-
Workers Federation (ITF) 
Unions of dockworkers and 
seafarers worldwide 
Ensuring protection of 
transport workers’ rights. 
World Shipping Council 
(WSC) 
Liner shipping companies Coordinating positions, 
advising, consulting and 
lobbying on behalf of liner 
shipping companies 
International Chamber of 
Shipping (ICS) 
Shipowners of all types Coordinating positions, 
advising, consulting and 
lobbying on behalf of 
shipowners 
Classification Societies (CSs) Public/Private management 
of industry standards and intl 
regulations 
Maintaining technical 
standards and managing 
state registries. 
International Association of 
Classifications Societies 
(IACS) 
Classification Societies Coordinating positions, 
advising, consulting and 
lobbying on behalf of CSs 
International Association of 
Independent Tanker Owners 
(Intertanko) 
Oil tanker owners Coordinating positions, 
advising, consulting and 




Maritime law associations Advocating for the 
unification of maritime law. 
Maritime London (ML)—
formerly International 
Maritime Industries Forum 
(IMIF) 




advising, consulting and 
lobbying on behalf of its 
representative sectors 
Table 2: Transnational Organizations in the Regime Complex 
Other Actors that Influence Shipping 
Shipbuilders: Companies that build ships build them to certain regulatory specifications. Certain 
states specialize in shipbuilding, especially China, South Korea and Japan. Shipbuilding is a 
specialized field and building a single ship can take months. As building ships is highly technical, 
shipbuilders have special advisory rolls in the IMO, and thus have influence over the shaping of 
policy.  




Shipowners: Ships are owned by individuals, ownership groups (companies), and to a much 
lesser extent, states. Though shipping is a massive global industry, it operates at a 
comparatively glacial economic growth pace compared to other global industries, particularly 
finance. Additionally, shipping is vulnerable to shocks from pretty much every other industry, 
and, because of this, it is particularly risky for investors such as private equity firms (Danyluk 
1996; Taylor 2001; Anders 2016). Thus, shipping is a unique industry that requires a high 
specialization of knowledge, an understanding of coordination, and risk management in order 
to profit from it (Konrad 2013). Private individuals that own ships are often wealthy, and come 
from generations of ship owning families, but also can be reclusive and secretive (Soare 2019). 
Service Sector: Shipping creates and relies on a multitude of international service sector jobs in 
numerous industries such as arbitrators, brokers, insurers, lawyers, bankers, and accountants 
specific to the industry, all of which play important roles and have varying degrees of interest in 
the political outcomes. Insurance companies, for instance can deem ships not fit for insurance, 
posing a major financial obstacle to shipowners’ ability to do business. Many of these service 
sector businesses have offices in London in order maintain close proximity to the IMO for 
lobbying and influencing purposes. 
Enforcement Mechanisms 
Although flag states are technically responsible for enforcing international instruments, they 
often lack the resources and proximity to do so, as I have argued in this thesis. Because of this 
peculiar assignment of responsibility, the regime complex has struggled to govern shipowner 




behavior. A series of incidents I will describe in Chapter 6 led to the development of regional 
enforcement mechanisms.  
Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs): MOUs are regional organizations of states that act to 
enforce international instruments created by the ILO and the IMO. They do this through the use 
of Port State Control (PSC, explained below). There are currently nine MOUs that represent 
most, though not all, of the world’s coastal land. For example, the Paris MOU represents most 
Western European states, the Tokyo MOU represents most of Southeast Asian states, and the 
Vina del Mar agreement represents most of Central and South American states.37 Although not 
part of an MOU, the US employs PSC with its own independently developed standards through 
the Coast Guard.  
Port State Control (PSC): PSC is a system of state-run agencies created in accordance with 
regional MOUs that employ Port State Control Officers (PSCOs) to enter ships to check if they 
comply with various regulations, primarily related to labor issues. PSCOs talk to crew members 
to make sure they are not overworked, underpaid etc, and inform them of their rights if/when 
they suspect that they are being treated unfairly. In such instances, PSCOs can issue warnings, 
or refuse to unload ships for a period that ultimately damage the ship owner’s reputation. 
PSCOs sometimes work alongside union dockworkers in the ITF, who help identify ships, 
shipowners, and states that are known to violate international instruments.  
 
37 See the Figure 8: Port State Control Map in Chapter 6. 




Classification Certificates Because PSC inspections can be lengthy, certain regulatory conditions 
are signaled by certificates that can be checked quickly and easily during PSCO boarding. These 
certificates are created by CSs. 
4.2 Map of the International Shipping Regime Complex 
Figure 4 partially illustrates the complexity of the regime in international shipping. 
Instruments that regulate international shipping are created in the IMO and the ILO. The IMO 
works on all issues in international shipping, overlapping with the ILO on labor issues. All 
member states are involved in the construction of instruments in the IMO, while only flag states 
fund it—meaning that states fund the IMO proportionate to registered DWT. Meanwhile a 
number of diverse groups have influence in policy creation: shipowner’s associations like the 
WSC, trade associations like the ICS, and IOs like the ILO and UNCTAD. The former two are 
funded and influenced by shipowners, shipbuilders, and service sector companies. The latter 
are influenced by their own member states and groups with consultative status, some of which 
are the same groups. Flag states are responsible for enforcing binding instruments such as 
Conventions from the IMO, but often contract that responsibility out to CSs in the case that 
they use a CS instead of managing their own registry. Because open registries and CSs were not 
effective at enforcing IMO instruments, port states began enforcing instruments through 
regional MOU PSC programs. PSC officers (PSCOs) are employed by port states and work in 
conjunction with port workers in the ITF to inspect and enforce international instruments when 
flag states fail in their responsibilities. The ITF helps PSC by maintaining lists of ships, 
shipowners, and flags that routinely violate instruments and merit careful inspection. Thus, 
there are a multitude of actors working in different ways to fund, influence and govern each 




other. Some of which overlap partially, others of which seem to be able to influence the design 
of the rules which they are supposed to be abide by.  
In order to illustrate the complexity of the regime, imagine the following scenario: A 
Bahamian flagged ship calls at the Port of Rotterdam. A port worker that is a member of the ITF 
tells a PSCO employed by the Netherlands under the Paris MOU that the ship is owned by a 
company that is known to be routinely in violation of the Convention of Safety of Life at Sea  
 







Figure 4: International Shipping Regime Complex Map 




(SOLAS). The SOLAS agreement, though an instrument of the IMO, was heavily influenced by a 
working group that included members of the ILO. The Bahamas has ratified SOLAS, so it is 
legally bound by that Convention. It is found that the Bahamian ship, owned by a Greek 
company, is violating a specific clause of the 1996 amendments to SOLAS, which the Bahamas 
had not ratified. That does not even matter, however, because the Paris MOU allows the 
Netherlands’ PSC to fine and detain ships that violate Conventions that port states ratify, even if 
flag states haven’t. The ship is detained, and the CS that manages the Greek company is moved 
to the “grey list” of the Paris MOU, meaning that another violation will see it banned from ports 
party to the Paris MOU. The delay in unloading also causes a delay in loading. The ship will now 
run behind schedule and thus risks losing its contract with its customers. The Greek owned 
company attempts to get coverage for lost revenue from the delay through protection and 
indemnity insurance from the service sector but is denied. Next the ship tries to offset the cost 
of the delay by not paying its Filipino seafarers during the two days it is detained. The ITF 
workers inform the workers of the Seafarers’ Bill of Rights written in conjunction with the ILO. 
They tell the workers that they can threaten legal action but should not leave the ship. As a 
result, the seafarers do not leave the ship, missing a rare opportunity to acquire goods from 
ashore. Importantly, this result would probably not happen in exactly the same way in another 
port under a different regional MOU, as different MOUs are not as strict in enforcing 
international instruments. Thus, shipowners often will relegate their older, more suspicion-
inducing ships and crews to shipping lines that call at ports that are less likely to enforce 
international instruments.  





 The international shipping regime has many different actors operating on many 
different levels and in different ways. Because of the density of the regime, I have argued that it 
constitutes a regime complex. The implication of regime complexity in international shipping is 
that a cacophony of interrelated parts fail to produce uniform results, expectations, or actions. 
A multitude of actors have overlapping and conflicting motivations, resulting in many micro tug-
of-war battles that fail to signal motivations to other actors, and fail to result in efficient or 
optimal outcomes. Thus, although there exist many communication channels, information is 
still not clearly or efficiently communicated. Shipping, as an integral part of globalized economic 
growth, requires clear rules, norms, and expectations in order to function smoothly and 
efficiently. In lieu of clarity of such rules, norms, and expectations, shipowners use whatever 
techniques are available to create an environment suitable for their needs. Because so much of 
shipping occurs in offshore spaces, it is relatively easy to obscure activities that violate the spirit 
of the regulatory environment.  
This all occurs despite the presence of mechanisms that are intended to incentivize 
compliance and ensure enforcement: IOs. The next chapter illustrates why the two IOs that 
operate in the regime complex fail to produce optimal or efficient outcomes. It provides a 
comparison of the institutional design of the two IOs that operate in the shipping space. 
Comparing the IOs provides clues for not only why they are ineffective, but how they might 
improve. Improving the IOs is an important measure that can make international shipping more 
efficient and ultimately lead to more optimal outcomes.  
  




Chapter 5 Comparing Design Features of the IMO and the ILO 
 In the international shipping regime complex, there are two international organizations 
(IOs) that create regulatory instruments: the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the 
International Labor Organization (ILO). These two IOs have significantly different institutional 
designs, which result in different power distribution dynamics. The IMO is designed in a way 
that sustains existing power imbalances in the regime complex. First, it fails to account for the 
peculiar assignment of authority in international shipping and in turn gives a disproportionate 
amount of power to actors with clear conflicts of interests: non-state (i.e., industry) actors with 
leverage over complicit Flag of Convenience (FOC) states. Second, it lacks transparency. To the 
extent that the former point is true, it is difficult to even assess the effect of industry capture 
because of significant obfuscation of governing details. Third, beyond assigning authority to 
states that lack the proximity to enforce, the IMO lacks an effective enforcement mechanism 
altogether.  
The ILO has several design features that could make the IMO more effective at 
governing. First, it varies in that power is explicitly structured in a unique tripartite manner. 
Three sets of stakeholders—government representatives, employers, and workers—each have 
an equal share of one third of the power in creating, voting for, and ratifying instruments. This 
ensures that power is balanced in a way that gives workers a voice in governing, a trait that is 
unique to the ILO. Second, the ILO achieves a higher level of transparency. Being more 
transparent increases the perceived legitimacy of the ILO because it makes representatives 
accountable for their positions and decisions. Third, although the ILO does not have a crucial 
enforcement mechanism, it employs a system of results-based management (RBM) that 




consistently nudges state behavior in the direction of change. Finally, the ILO is ultimately only 
effective as its purview allows: it is concerned only with labor issues and also lacks 
enforcement.  
The difference between the institutional design of these two IOs results in noticeably 
different policy outcomes. The IMO creates instruments in a slow, more complicated manner 
and instruments require a much higher threshold to become binding. The process ultimately 
benefits the stakeholders with the most power: private industry actors and the states that are 
complicit in their role in governance. The ILO process is faster and more streamlined. Its use of 
RBM is a necessary measure that monitors accountability. Thus, the ILO process is both more 
optimal and more efficient. However, both IOs ultimately lack enforcement mechanisms.  
The remainder of the chapter compares the institutional design of these two IOs. The 
two IOs are examined separately. First, I describe the structure of each IO. Second, I describe 
the extent to which each IO is transparent, and accountable to their commitments. Third, I 
detail the process of how each IO constructs instruments. Fourth, I look at how power is 
balanced in the two IOs. Finally, I conclude that the IMO could improve significantly by 
incorporating some design features of the ILO. At the end of the day, however, even after 
adopting these features, the two IOs still lack a necessary enforcement mechanism.  
5.1 The International Maritime Organization 
Like many IOs and institutions that exist in the current international order, the IMO was 
created in the wake of World War II. The need for an IO to deal with international maritime 
laws came out of an increasingly complex patchwork of international agreements and 




governance efforts between intergovernmental and private bodies. “Over the years, the 
number of organizations engaged in the preparation of rules on shipping increased 
substantially. Hence it became apparent that there was a need for a body which would be able 
to co-ordinate and promote further measures on a permanent basis.” (Mankabady 1984: p 2). 
The Convention for the International Maritime Consultative Organization38 was drafted in 1948, 
and went into effect in 1958, when it fulfilled the necessary requirement of acceptance by 21 
states, 7 of which registered at least a million gross tons per annum. Using tonnage shipped as 
way to gauge the importance of stakeholder states would persist in many forms as the IMCO 
matured over time. The purpose of this section is to examine the structure and effectiveness of 
the IMCO/IMO. After the following section, I will examine the structure and effectiveness of the 
ILO along the same dimensions of evaluation.  
5.1.1 The Structure of the IMO  
 The IMO is a specialized agency of the United Nations (UN), and is structured similarly to 
the UN.39 It has three main organs: The Assembly, which is the highest body; The Council, which 
has rotating membership of states largely buoyed by former Allied states; and the Secretariat, 
which performs a lot of the fact-finding and analysis that aides in the decision making process. 
The Secretariat is divided into six organs and recruits civil servants with a focus on wide 
geographic distribution. Outside of the three main organs, there are two committees that meet 
on technical matters and specific issues, including the Maritime Safety Commission (MSC),40 
 
38 The organization would later change its name to the International Maritime Organization. For the purpose of this 
chapter, IMO and IMCO will be used interchangeably depending on which is appropriate.  
39 See http://www.imo.org 
40 This is the only committee specifically designated in the IMCO Convention. 




and the Marine Environment Protection Committee (MPEC),41 as well as several 
subcommittees.  
Like in the UN, the Assembly is considered the highest body, and every member state is 
represented in it, but also like in the UN, the Council is the body with the most effective power. 
The Assembly meets once a year, but the Council meets at minimum twice a year, often more. 
The Council sets the agenda for Assembly meetings and creates the instruments that the 
Assembly will vote on. Like the UN Security Council, the IMO Council has a tiered structure. The 
Council has 40 members in three categories: “Category A includes 10 States with the largest 
interest in providing international shipping services; Category B includes 10 States with the 
largest interest in international seaborne trade; Category C includes 20 States not elected under 
A or B above, which have special interests in maritime transport or navigation and whose 
election to the Council will ensure the representation of all major geographic areas of the 
world.”42 Originally all three categories were decided using a mathematical formula that 
assessed tonnage and UN contribution levels, but was modified in 1975 to remove the tonnage 
and contribution assessment, in favor of a democratic election process.43 Although all 
categories of the Council are on the ballot for each biennial session, Category A has not 
 
41 Added by the Assembly later on.  
42 See http://www.imo.org/en/About/Pages/Structure.aspx The Council has changed in size over the years. 
Originally it included all members, but as the size of the IMO increased the Council pared down to 24 members, 
then up to 32, and is 40. It may increase to 52 in the near future.  
43 The first two categories do seem to roughly correlate to (A) beneficial ownership and (B) DWT registered, based 
on UNCTAD data sheets. (https://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx -> Maritime 
Transport -> World Merchant Fleet -> Merchant fleet by country of beneficial ownership and Merchant fleet by 
flag of registration) Its unclear how states are elected to the third category.  




changed in 15 years, while Category B and C show very little movement from session to 
session.44 
5.1.2 The IMO is a Black Box with Peculiar Design Features 
 Beyond the structure of the IMO, what may matter even more are its many institutional 
design feature peculiarities. To begin with, the IMO is funded by assessed contributions based 
on a flat base rate with additional components based on ability to pay and merchant fleet 
tonnage. The flat base rate is based on UN contributions and is rather trivial: it ranges from two 
thousand (for states that make up 2% or less of the UN assessed contributions) to ten thousand 
(for states that make up 10% or more of UN assessed contributions) US dollars. The tonnage-
based contributions are far more significant, as the IMO budget was roughly 44 million US 
dollars per year in its last full biennial session.45 Tonnage is measured by flag of registration. 
According to the IMO 
Each Member [pays] an additional assessment determined by the gross registered 
tonnage of its merchant marine, as shown in the latest edition of Lloyd’s Register of 
Shipping, on the basis of one share for every 1,000 tons. In practice, therefore, 
contributions to the IMO budget are based primarily on shipping tonnage rather than 
national wealth. This system is unique in the United Nations system.46  
Thus, states fund the IMO in proportion to their registered fleets, which are mostly nominal in 
the case of FOCs. It follows then that the states with the top 10 fleets by size provide over two 
 
44 China, Greece, Italy, Japan, Norway, Panama, South Korea, Russia, the UK, and the US have all been on elected 
to the Council through Category A for the last 15 years, since the Category was expanded from 8 states to 10. 
Records of Council membership are nearly impossible to find before that.  
45 According to IMO Resolution A.1112(30) for the 2018-2019 biennium session. 
46 See http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/Convention-on-the-International-
Maritime-Organization.aspx 




thirds of the IMO’s funding. These states are disproportionately FOCs—five out of ten—and 
disproportionately represented on the IMO Council—seven out of ten.47  
The IMO is unusual in that receives a large part of its funding from countries outside the 
developed world. The main contributors include flag-of-convenience states such as 
Panama - which accounts for more than 18 per cent of the budget - Liberia and the 
Bahamas. (Guerra and Peel 2001: p 12) 
The IMO Council, which used to elect member states based on certain mathematical 
formulas, has not done so for many years. In fact, the IMO Council does not publish the details 
of how its members are elected, how votes are counted, and which states vote for which 
actions.  
Nine of the IMO’s top 10 contributors currently occupy elected positions on the 
Council,48 which is the organization’s executive body. The provision of funding does not 
necessarily equate to a seat on the Council or to influence within it. Yet the Council, 
which publishes no substantive information about its regular activities or elections, lacks 
mechanisms to provide public assurance that the states that fund the IMO are not 
simply buying influence. (Amin et al. 2018: p 2) 
Many IMO instruments do not become active until they are ratified by states that register a 
certain percentage of global deadweight tonnage (DWT). Because five FOC states register over 
half the world’s DWT, and 10 over two thirds, small groups of states have an effective veto 
power over the policy decision-making process.  
Imagine this scenario: An FOC state has contracted out the management of its entire 
registry to a private Classification Society (CS). The CS uses the profits it makes from the low 
taxes and fees it pays the state that contracts it to pay the state’s assessed contributions in the 
 
47 See http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/Pages/32-Council-elections-A31.aspx for information 
on the 2020-2021 biennium Council member states and https://www.itfglobal.org/en/sector/seafarers/flags-of-
convenience for the ITF’s list of FOC states  
48 In the 2018-2019 biennium session. 




IMO. The state then allows members of the CS to represent the state on the IMO Council. The 
representatives of the CS then have the ability to shape the policy-making process. Other states 
may allow different private industry stakeholders to represent them—shipowners, builders, 
insurers, investors, members of NGOS, etc. In this way, private industry stakeholders are 
directly involved in creating instruments that they themselves are governed by. Then, in the 
Assembly, if the CS and other private industry stakeholders representing states do not approve 
of the instruments that were created, they do not ratify them on behalf of the state they are 
representing. Because many of the states that contract representation out have 
disproportionate ratification power, they wield a considerable amount of power over whether 
or not instruments, especially Conventions, become ratified. Imagine also that multiple states 
Figure 5: Private Industry Influence 
 CS = Classification Society, but this scenario can apply to other stakeholders as well. 




are contracting out their IMO representation to private industry stakeholders. This will 
considerably diminish the representative power of states that are represented by members of 
their own government. This effect is compounded by the fact that FOC states’ ratifications have 
disproportionate power because they represent massive amounts of DWT. This scenario 
creates clear conflicts of interest, but nothing about it is contrary to the IMO’s rules, and 
because the IMO lacks transparency, there is no way to know that this scenario is or is not 
happening.  
 Although the IMO brings together states, NGOs, transnational organizations, and private 
industry actors, the latter likely have disproportionate influence compared to the other three. 
According to a report by Transparency International, private industry actors overrepresented 
civil society organizations five to one, and labor organizations three to one (Amin et al. 2018).49 
In addition, as mentioned above, many FOCs outsource the management of their registries to 
CSs, which are essentially private industry companies. According to the same report, “At least 
17 states, representing 22.9 per cent of world tonnage, have fully outsourced the management 
of their ship registries to private companies.” (Amin et al. 2018: p 13). Private industry actors 
are permitted to represent states on all levels of policymaking. Even if certain states work to 
maintain a balance of representation independently, full private industry representation on the 
part of other states will overcompensate for any intended balancing effect. With such heavy 
private industry saturation, it is worth considering that the IMO, as an intergovernmental body, 
verges into the territory of a quasi-industry association.  
 
49 312 to 64 and 101, respectively. 




 It is difficult to assess the amount that private industry actually has captured the 
governing process in the IMO because of a lack of transparency. Little of what happens in actual 
IMO meetings is reported out. Minutes from Assembly, Council, and subcommittee meetings 
are often incomplete or vague, and fail to represent the identities of participants, or the 
positions that state representatives or private actors take. Though members of the press are 
allowed to attend meetings, they are vetted, made to sign non-disclosure agreements, and are 
not allowed to report the details of what happens at meetings—which participants attend, or 
what position states take (Amin et al. 2018: p 3). The IMO Internal Office of Ethics and 
Oversight was founded as recently as 2012, and the IMO Code of Ethics went into effect in 2016 
(IMO Code of Ethics). Both only provide oversight for the Secretariat, which is led by the 
Secretary General, who is nominated by the Council and elected by the Assembly.50 There are 
no rules prohibiting conflicts of interests in terms of private industry employment for either 
representatives in the Council or the Assembly. According to an article in the Economist, “In 
2014, St Lucia appointed a Saudi billionaire without previous shipping experience as its IMO 
representative; a court in London judged in 2016 that the appointment was obtained in order 
to gain diplomatic immunity against divorce proceedings” (Economist 2018: p 15). Additionally, 
there is no rule against or limit to political gifting. The same article says that “[g]oodies put on 
top of desks at an IMO assembly meeting last year were so heavy that they broke 137 sets of 
headphones underneath” (Economist 2018: p 15). Suffice it to say that there is at least some 
 
50 The Code of Ethics refers to “International Maritime Organization Personnel,” meaning civil servants that work 
for the IMO.  




reason for suspicion that the IMO operates in a way that fails to fairly balance the interests of 
all of its stakeholders.  
5.1.3 Analyzing Power in the IMO 
 There are of course some legitimate responses to the perceived issues above. It is 
perhaps most important to understand that the IMO is an agency that deals with an extremely 
technical industry, and thus one might expect a high amount of industry involvement. 
Additionally, shipping is one of the most globalized sectors of the world economy and links 
many other sectors together. As is such, the list of stakeholders in the industry may be both 
long and convoluted. China may need to represent its shipbuilders, its shipowners, and its 
producers in ways that sometimes conflict, for instance. States with large fleets may be pitted 
against states with large industries in one subsector, while other states might work 
cooperatively to protect owners that reside in one country and register their fleet in another.  
 But these practices yield suboptimal, even dangerous outcomes by skewing the 
regulatory process. This is directly observable in the area of climate governance. Influence Map, 
a research firm that traces industry influence in government, issued a report that details the 
IMO’s process for enacting new climate policy in a way that illustrates how different states 
represent different sectors of the industry. Shipping is one of the few industries conspicuously 
left out of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. International action on climate change in 
shipping was left in the purview of the IMO. Although it has relatively little skin in the game, 
Brazil led the opposition to capping emissions, likely because it was represented by mining 




company Vale, who sent 13 representatives to the Marine Environment Protection Committee 
of the IMO between 2015 and 2017 (O’Neill 2018: p 7).  
Brazil, a big exporter of iron ore to China, fears overzealous caps could drive shipping 
costs higher, helping its competitor, Australia, whose ores travel a quarter as far as 
Brazil's. The idea of slowing vessels down draws ire from countries that export 
perishable goods, like cherries and grapes, as Chile does. (Economist 2018: p 58) 
China, Japan, and South Korea all backed the opposition. It’s notable that these are some the 
leading states in the shipbuilding industry, as well as in exporting.51 Panama also opposes 
significant climate action, because, the report proposes, Japanese and South Korean 
shipowners flag a high percentage of their ships in Panama. “Of the eight delegates Panama 
sent to the key 2017 MEPC meeting it chaired, three were representatives of the company 
operating its shipping registry, the Panama Maritime Authority, of which Japanese shipping 
owners appear to be major clients” (O’Neill 2018: p 3). This is an example of members from one 
state influencing the negotiation process through representatives of another.  
This Japan-Panama relationship is noteworthy in recent climate developments at the 
IMO as the MEPC chair (which rotates with each meeting) was held by Panama in 2017 
and was subsequently handed on to Japan who chairs the crucial discussions currently 
underway. (O’Neill 2018: p 9) 
 
Interestingly, the proponents of climate action are led by the second biggest FOC state, the 
Marshall Islands, perhaps a proxy for another group of private industry stakeholders in another 
state.  
Although it is not totally clear which stakeholders take which position on any specific 
issue for what reason, it is clear that private industry stakeholders have an effect on the 
 
51 Based on the UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2018 




negotiation process. In the example above, Brazil and Japan are two of the largest players, yet 
register relatively little DWT compared to other states. Panama may be playing a proxy role for 
Japan, and the Marshall Islands leads proponents for change, even though its fleet is mostly 
nominally registered. The goal of the proponents had been to reach zero emissions by 2050, 
but the result was an agreement to reduce emissions by half of the current amount in that 
same time. The effect is significant, considering the industry’s greenhouse gas output has been 
estimated to be as large as 3% of global output, or roughly as much as Germany’s. This outcome 
is inefficient because actor motivations are obfuscated by proxy positions and industry 
representatives. It is suboptimal because it fails to rise to the urgency of the issue relative to 
efforts in other issue areas and despite new technological possibilities.  
5.1.4 How an International Maritime Standard is Adopted 
 The path by which a policy idea becomes a binding international law in the IMO is long 
and vulnerable to dilution and convolution in many ways. First the Council assigns work to the 
relevant committee or subcommittee, which then produce “instruments,” which include 
Conventions, Amendments, Codes of Practice, recommendations and guidelines. “Conventions 
are binding when ratified, Resolutions are merely an advising character, and codes stand 
between the two. Some of the Codes have become indispensable tools for the conduct of 
maritime shipping.” (Mankabady 1984: p 11). A proper hierarchy then looks like this: 
Instrument Type Practical Effect 
Conventions Binding 
Codes  Informal conventions, not binding 
Resolutions Recommendations, not binding 
Table 3: IMO Instruments 




Completed instruments are submitted to conferences of delegations which are open to all 
members in the Assembly. Each Convention specifies its own ratification requirements. 
Requirements can take the form of a specified number of states ratifying, such as a majority or 
two thirds, a DWT percentage requirement, or some combination of the two.  
States may need to change their domestic laws before being able to ratify Conventions, 
so there are also different expressions of consent to be bound including “signature,” 
“ratification,” “acceptance,” “approval” and “signature subject to ratification, acceptance, or 
approval.” Signatures can be immediately binding on the state if the representative signing was 
given such authority, or they can become binding at some later specified juncture. Conventions 
often give states a period of time to change their laws and formally ratify the treaty, sometimes 
resulting in multiple year delays of Conventions actually coming into force. Thus, states can sign 
Conventions knowing full well that the number of states needed, or DWT threshold will never 
be met. In some circumstances, considerable parts of Conventions may become outdated or 
irrelevant by the time the Convention comes into force.  
Amendments to Conventions require two thirds of contracting states’ ratifications. “This 
usually means that more acceptances are required to amend a convention then were originally 
required to bring the Convention into force.” (Mankabady 1984: p 12). Because Amendments 
are often needed to update out-of-date parts of Conventions, this can cause further delays in 
achieving the goals of Amendments and Conventions. In some cases, “tacit acceptance” is 
written into Conventions, a clause that implies that no formal ratification is needed to make an 
Amendment binding for states that have already ratified the Convention it amends. After all 
these protracted, legalistic processes, it is ultimately up to flag states how and whether to 




actually enforce Conventions that they are a party to. That is to say that the IMO has no formal 
enforcement process for its Conventions. By contrast, the World Trade Organization provides a 
dispute settlement mechanism that is designed to discourage states from taking unilateral 
action against trade partners that are seen as violating rules by providing a legal forum to hear 
complaints in front of a group of member states (Srinivasen 2007).52  
This section observed some specific design flaws that make the IMO ineffective and 
suboptimal as leading authority in maritime governance: its vulnerability to capture by private 
industry actors, its lack of transparency, and its convoluted instrument creation process. The 
next section will look at the same aspects in relation to the ILO. Although the ILO is structured 
in a similar way—a democratic body with delegations from all member states, an agenda 
setting body with subset of states, and secretariat body that carries out research and support 
functions— and also lacks an enforcement mechanism, it has several crucial differences that 
make it much better at creating legitimate and effective instruments. First, the ILO explicitly 
provides for worker representation in every body and at every level of policy making. Second, it 
is much more transparent than the IMO. Its meetings are open to the public and it keeps 
extensive, often verbatim minutes of all of its meetings on its website. Third, it implements 
results-based management (RBM), which creates a base level of accountability for states in the 
way they implement instruments.  
 
52 See https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_body_e.htm 




5.2 The International Labor Organization 
 Before the IMO Convention, the main IO that attempted to deal with maritime issues 
was the ILO. The ILO was created during the interwar period, though it has roots in a networked 
epistemic community of international labor law groups53 that emerged at the turn of the 
twentieth century and united around common goals of “social justice and the right to decent 
work” (Van Daele 2005: p 438). At the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, international labor policy 
experts of Europe were joined by union leaders of America, particularly Samuel Gompers, the 
head of the American Federation of Labor (AFL), as well as members of government. 
Importantly, representatives for employers were not present for the entirety of the 
negotiations that led to the founding of the ILO. In this sense, the roots of the ILO are based in a 
bottom up—labor inclusive—approach, whereas the roots of the IMO were very much based in 
a top down—management focused—approach, through the collaboration of only state and 
private industry actors. “This structure, in which workers, employers, and governments 
developed worldwide labour standards together, was to be both a revolutionary and an 
innovative foundation for the future ILO” (Van Daele 2005: p 451). Thus, the ILO was 
underpinned by a normative consensus to distribute power in a manner that was fair. This what 
led to the unique institutional design of the ILO. 
5.2.1 Structure of the ILO54 
The ILO is unique among other IOs in that its design emphasizes the representation of 
 
53 According to Van Daele, the Second International, an informal socialist movement, and the International 
Association for Labour Legislation (IALL), a group of policy intellectuals that operated as a sort of intellectual 
network to trade policy ideas, were part front and center in the creation of the ILO.  
54 The information in this section is drawn from https://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/how-the-ilo-works/lang--
en/index.htm 




workers. At every level of the ILO, there is tripartite representation of governments, workers, 
and employers. The ILO has a similar structure to the UN as well, in that it has three main 
bodies. The first is the International Labor Conference (ILC), which meets once year and 
represents all of the ILO’s constituent states. Each state in the Conference is represented by 
four delegates: two delegates that represent the state’s government, one that represents the 
state’s workers, and one that represents the state’s employers. According to the ILO’s website  
Every delegate has the same rights, and all can express themselves freely and vote as 
they wish. So it happens that worker and employer delegates sometimes vote against 
their government’s representatives or against each other. This diversity of viewpoints, 
however, does not prevent decisions being adopted by very large majorities, or in some 
cases even unanimously.55 
 
The second is the Governing Body.56 The governing body is similar to the IMO Council, in that it 
is both smaller, and performs the executive functions of the ILO, including agenda setting, 
budgeting, and electing the ILO Director General. Like the ILC, the Governing Body also takes 
the tripartite structure, with representation of governments, employers, and workers being 
roughly equal. Like in both the UN and IMO, this body is structured in a way that gives 
permanence to “states of chief industrial importance,” in this case the largest economic 
powers, most of which are similar to the permanent five of the UN Security Council, or Category 
A of the IMO Council. Thus it is broken down as follows:  
1. 56 titular members (28 Governments, 14 Employers and 14 Workers) Ten of which are 
permanently held by Brazil, China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, the Russian 
Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States. The other Government 
members are elected by the Conference every three years. The Employer and Worker 
members are elected in their individual capacity.  
2. 66 deputy members (28 Governments, 19 Employers and 19 Workers).57 
 
55 See https://www.ilo.org/ilc/AbouttheILC/lang--en/index.htm 
56 Information for this section is drawn from https://www.ilo.org/gb/about-governing-body/lang--en/index.htm 
57 Ibid. 





The third body is the International Labor Office, which is a permanent secretariat under the 
supervision of the Director General. The secretariat has a staff of 2,700 employees—a third of 
which work explicitly in a technical capacity—working in over 40 states that performs tasks in 
coordination with the Governing Body.  
 Although both the IMO and ILO are structured similarly, the key difference between the 
two organizations is in the ILO’s tripartite power structure that stretches across all three of its 
main bodies. Whereas in the IMO there is no rule against private industry representation in any 
of its three main bodies, committees, or subcommittees, the ILO explicitly requires balanced 
representation in all of its three main bodies. This explicit representation means that workers 
are guaranteed a seat at the table. The structure of the ILO recognizes that employer—private 
industry—inclusion is important. After all, leaders from this sector can provide highly 
specialized knowledge unavailable in the other two sectors. The provision for explicit balancing, 
however, immunizes the organization from the kind of industry capture observable in the IMO.  
5.2.2 The ILO is Mostly Transparent, but Not Conflict Free 
If the IMO is a black box, the ILO is considerably more transparent in the way that it 
operates. The ILO documents minutes from all its meetings online;58 the minutes are detailed—
in some cases verbatim—and identify all the participants and who they represent. ILO 
Conference meetings allow members with UN press accreditation to attend and record audio 
and video while additionally sometimes providing live video streams for those that cannot 
 
58 On https://www.ilo.org/ search minutes. There are thousands of pages available, sorted by year, topic, body etc. 
Many are recorded verbatim.  




attend.59 Governing Body meetings are open to the public as well, unless the Governing Body 
votes to disallow the public for security reasons. Oversight and ethics offices have strict, 
conspicuously published conflict of interest rules for the International Labor Office.60 Although 
the rules don’t seem to apply to the Conference or Governing Body, the tripartite structure 
ensures fair representation to the extent that union representatives often represent workers, 
and government employees represent governments.61 The ILO has explicit, published rules 
prohibiting any political gifting,62 and has offices dedicated to fraud and corruption, as well as 
explicit procedures for reporting cases.63  
Still, although the ILO is more transparent than the IMO, it is not free from conflicts of 
interest. First, aside from guaranteeing workers a seat at the table, tripartite representation 
also guarantees employers a seat at the table. The ILO does not explicitly prohibit any industries 
from representing employers. There has been considerable pressure for the ILO to prohibit 
tobacco companies from representing employers, for instance. Second, the ILO is not 
discriminatory about the source of voluntary contributions. Private industry groups from 
stigmatized industries can bundle money and donate it directly or channel it through state 
voluntary contributions. According to LaDou et al., over half of the ILO’s funding came from 
voluntary contributions in 2017 (2018: p 3). Voluntary contributions might be made with 
expectations or to reward certain behavior or punish certain undesirable behavior. “Voluntary 
 
59 In more recent meetings, they even provide preferred hashtags. Clearly, they are not concerned about details 
from meetings being broadcast. 
60 See https://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/how-the-ilo-works/accountability-and-transparency/ethics-
office/WCMS_713453/lang--en/index.htm 








contributions are characteristically designated for specific purposes proposed by the donor. 
Which leaves … the ILO open to member state and corporate mischief, influence, and outright 
control” (LaDou et al. 2018: p 3).In sum, the ILO has several crucial design features that are superior 
with respect to the IMO. First, the tripartite representation model explicitly provides workers with a seat 
at the table. In turn, this ensures a balance of representation that is immune from industry capture. 
Second, the ILO puts a greater emphasis on transparency and accountability. Its meetings are open to 
journalists and the public and it provides minutes for all of its meetings, which are often recorded 
verbatim. The next section will describe how instruments are created in the ILO, contrasting this process 
with IMO process.  
5.2.3 Analyzing Power in the ILO 
 Inasmuch as its purview is restricted to labor issues, the ILO’s stakeholder motivations 
are considerably clear than those of the IMO. While actors in shipping can work in multiple 
sectors and thus have multiple motivations, and states can employ representatives that conflict 
in positions, stakeholder motivations in labor are more obvious. As previously mentioned, ILO 
explicitly balances representation between states, employers, and workers. The tripartite 
structure of the ILO naturally mitigates against industry capture by creating explicit 
requirements for the different designations of representatives each state can employ in its 
decision-making bodies. Unlike in the IMO, voting power is not weighted by any metric that 
attempts to represent states by the amount they contribute to or constitute in the global labor 
market. Essentially, each state has the same amount of voting power, and has to distribute it 
fairly amongst its national government, employers, and workers. This distribution surely leads 
to more equitable outcomes than the power distribution in the IMO.  




 Additionally, the ILO employs a much larger and geographically spread out secretariat 
than the IMO. The ILO Office staff is 2,700 employees across 40 states, vs the IMO’s 300 
employees at its Secretariat headquarters in London. A third of the ILO Office staff work in an 
explicitly technical capacity whereas no similar distinction exists for the IMO. Essentially, the 
ILO puts more of an emphasis on the breadth and balance of its bureaucratic body. This allows 
the Office to have more influence in member state behavior, because expert level staff are 
distributed widely across the ILO’s constituent states. This widely distributed staff is thus more 
adequately equipped to hold member states accountable for their stated commitments. The 
Office can perform this function via extensive research in member states’ individual laws and 
the critical process of RBM.64 
5.2.4 How an International Labor Standard is Adopted65 
Compared to the IMO, the ILO’s process for creating and adopting legislation is both 
simpler and more straightforward (see Figure 6). The Governing Body meets three times a year 
to prepare for the annual ILO Conference by working on its agenda. The Governing Body sends 
proposed legislation to the Office so that it can research member states’ existing domestic laws 
before making certain recommendations. The Office prepares and delivers a report to member 
states in preparation for the Conference. The Office then prepares the draft instrument to be 
proposed and discussed at the Conference. The Conference then comments on and amends to 
the instrument as necessary before voting on it. A two thirds majority is required to approve 
 
64 Explained in the next section. 
65 Drawn from https://www.ilo.org/global/standards/introduction-to-international-labour-standards/international-
labour-standards-creation/lang--en/index.htm 






Figure 6: Instrument Creation Process in the ILO.  
Source: https://www.ilo.org/global/standards/introduction-to-international-labour-standards/international-
labour-standards-creation/WCMS_084158/lang--en/index.htm 




The ILO produces three types of instruments: Conventions, Recommendations, and 
Resolutions. First, Conventions, which when ratified, require states to incorporate their rules 
into domestic law. Second, are Recommendations, which deal with subjects “not currently 
appropriate for the object of a convention,” or to compliment or clarify specific parts of 
Conventions, and to create technical guidance for actions included in Conventions. Third, 
Resolutions, which act as suggestions of measures for states to adopt into domestic law, or act 
in certain ways. Thus, there is a clearly articulated expectation for ways in which states are 
meant to comply with the three types of instruments created by the ILO.  
The ILO approves instruments in significantly different ways than the IMO. The key 
differences in the ILO rule-making procedure are first, that states can ratify Conventions before 
incorporating their rules into domestic law; second, that states are given a smaller amount of 
time to adjust to ILO Conventions than to IMO Conventions, and third, its emphasis on RBM, 
which requires reporting and assessment by states about how and whether they are complying 
with Conventions. Rather than an enforcement mechanism, RBM is more of an accountability 
measure. It is used to assess and nudge state behavior toward desirable outcomes.  
Conventions are not binding on states until they are ratified. Importantly, however, 
Conventions become binding on member states party to them 12 months after just two 
member states ratify them. Thus, the threshold is much lower for Conventions to take effect 
than in the IMO, where some specified amount of DWT registered by ratifying member states is 
needed to for Conventions to go into effect.  





Besides the ILO’s tripartite structure, the ILO’s most significant variation from an 
institutional design standpoint is its emphasis on results and accountability. The ILO employs 
RBM, a structured plan that designates how ideas are planned, funded, implemented, the 
appropriate time frames for each stage, and how progress is assessed. RBM was not an 
integrated concept in the ILO at its inception but was developed by the UN Development 
Program network and incorporated into the ILO framework in the year 2000 to address a 
deficiency in accountability. Specifically, the ILO’s RBM strategy seeks to integrate multiple 
bodies and actors into collaborative efforts to work on specific goals in a way that ensures 
accountability, reflection, and results. “The ILO has focused its efforts on developing a more 
robust results framework; having fewer and more focused outcomes or result areas; and 
introducing greater rigour in measuring results” (Bester 2016: p 15).66 Evaluations for 
strategies, policies, and country-level improvements related to specific policies are generated 
by the Office and reported to the Governing Body in preparation for its annual meeting. The 
Governing Body then must follow up with an Evaluation Advisory Committee set up by the 
Director General. This process leads to a continual prodding of committees, states, and actors 
to improve their actions with regard to instruments implemented by the ILO. RBM is important 
because it creates accountability. For instance, Recommendations, although not binding, are 
subject to RBM, and thus states that ratify Recommendations must constantly report on 
progress in achieving goals and take suggests for improvement (Fontoura 2013). Thus, although 
 
66 As detailed by Bester in the 2016 UNDS Quadrennial Report, “Rules Based Management in the United Nations 
Development System,” pg 15, 21. https://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/qcpr/pdf/sgr2016-studies-rbm-8jan2016.pdf 




Conventions are considered binding under international law and Recommendations are not, 
similar pressure is applied to states to comply with both.  
5.3 Toward a More Effective IMO 
 For the IMO to govern shipping more effectively, it should adopt some of the design 
features of the ILO. This would expand better governance to the entire international shipping 
regime complex, instead of just covering labor issues. First, the IMO should strive to balance 
stakeholder representation. The current balance in the IMO overwhelmingly favors private 
industry actors over states, workers, and scientific experts. Providing for the explicit 
representation of these groups would help the IMO address issues. Second, the IMO should 
increase accountability by implementing RBM. RBM can be an effective tool because it 
consistently reminds states of their commitments and nudges them toward better enforcement 
measures. Third, the IMO should change the process for activating instruments to make it 
faster and change the leverage of states’ votes. Last, the IMO should increase its transparency 
by opening meetings to the media and documenting identities of persons representing states in 
both the Assembly and Council. This would also increase the IMO’s accountability, and 
perceived legitimacy. 
 First, the IMO should adopt a system of representation that balances stakeholders 
similar to the ILO’s tripartite structure. As it stands now, there are no explicit requirements or 
prohibitions dictating which actors can and cannot represent states. The result has been what 
appears to be significant private industry capture: states have employed shipowners and other 
private industry stakeholders to represent them in the Council and the Assembly. In that 
regard, these two bodies are already a mixture of government and business owner 




representatives. Explicitly requiring worker representation in the IMO would ensure that a 
larger amount of stakeholder concerns are addressed at the IMO. Worker representatives could 
be elected via the ITF to ensure that worker representation is genuine. Because the IMO deals 
not only with labor issues, it should also explicitly require representation of scientific experts 
for the construction of instruments dealing with environmental issues. Doing so would help 
ensure that the instruments created were adequate to deal with the scale of the issues.  
 Second, the IMO should implement a system of RBM. States can ratify IMO Conventions, 
but implementing the solutions called for in the IMO Conventions can be difficult based on the 
diffuse nature of shipping. RBM helps IOs create effective solutions to problems by requiring 
the creation of goals and the constant assessment of states’ progress toward achieving them. 
Although RBM is not a replacement for a strong enforcement mechanism, it does create a layer 
of accountability by encouraging states to continue to make progress toward achieving goals 
related to agreements they are party to and constantly nudging them to improve. Failure to 
meet goals or make progress can create reputational damage. At a bare minimum, RBM creates 
an accountability mechanism that records state progress.  
 Third, instruments should become active in a balanced and consistent manner. 
Currently, the manner in which Conventions become active is subject to the terms of each 
individual Convention. Thus, those terms can be adjusted to make Conventions either more 
difficult or easy to bring into force. However, most Conventions require ratification of states 
representing over half the world’s DWT. Because five states—Panama, Liberia, the Marshall 
Islands, Hong Kong and Singapore—together register over half the world’s DWT, this gives them 
enormous bargaining power over most Conventions. For Conventions to become active, they 




must be drafted in a way that ensures these five states will not act as a bloc and effectively veto 
them. Because a large amount of DWT is registered nominally—without a genuine link to the 
state—a better ratification process would either adjust for this discrepancy by incorporating 
data on state of beneficial ownership, which is calculated by UNCTAD, or simply give each state 
proportionate ratification power.  
 Finally, the IMO should adopt a higher standard of transparency. From the outside, the 
IMO might appear to be a healthy functioning IO in that it meets regularly and produces 
instruments that shape the behavior of states and other international actors. Transparency in 
reporting the details of meetings, the identities of representatives and the positions they take 
on issues would allow media and interest groups to hold specific states and actors accountable 
for the instruments and actions taken or not by the IMO. Transparency could increase pressure 
on states and actors to behave in ways that help realize the shared goals of the members of the 
IMO. Increasing transparency would also increase the perceived legitimacy of the IMO.  
Summary 
 On the surface both the IMO and ILO have similar design features. They both have large 
deliberative bodies, smaller agenda setting bodies, and bureaucratic organs for research and 
administrative duties. They both have constituencies that include the majority of states in the 
world. Instruments follow similar paths to becoming either recommendations or binding 
international obligations in both IOs. But the IOs differ in important ways which have 
implications for their effectiveness as governing bodies. Most importantly, they differ in their 
representation models, their transparency, their accountability methods, and their purview. 
The institutional design of the ILO produces more effective outcomes than that of the IMO 




considering the first three of these points, but not the last one. The IMO should be reformed in 
a way that reflects some of the superior design qualities of the ILO. Still, both IOs lack the ability 
to enforce the instruments they create.  
If the IMO implemented the above recommended design features of the ILO, it may 
become both more accountable and more effective. In this case, the IMO might produce better 
rules, but good rules are meaningless without an enforcement mechanism, which neither IO 
has. The next chapter describes how a regional solution was created to enforce the instruments 
created by the IMO and ILO. The regime complex was not set up to enforce international 
instruments due to its peculiar assignment of authority to flag states. Flag states lack both the 
proximity and incentive to enforce instruments in many cases. The creation of regional 
Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) that give port states authority to enforce 
international instruments was a crucial step in shaping state and actor behavior in the 












 ILO IMO 
Established After WWI After WWII 
Membership 187 member states 174 member states 
Branch that sets Agenda Conference: 56 titular 
members (10 permanent + 
elected 18 governments, 14 
employers, 14 Workers) + 66 
deputy members (28 
governments, 19 Employers, 
19 Workers) 
Council: 40 state delegations 
from three categories: 
Category A: 10 states with 
the largest interest in 
international shipping 
Category B: 10 states with 
the largest interest in 
international seaborne trade 
Category C: 20 states not 
elected under A or B 
Branch that Votes Governing Body: each state 
has a delegation with 
tripartite representation (2 
government, 1 employer, 1 
worker) with 1 vote. 
Assembly: each member 
states has a delegation and 
voting power is sometimes 
proportionate and 
sometimes based on 
registered DWT.  
Branch that generates 
research and reports 
International Labor Office: 
2700 employees across 40 
states, 1/3 of which are 
required to be technical 
experts. 
IMO Secretariat: 300 
employees at IMO 
headquarters in London. 
Executive Director General: Elected by 
the Governing Body, five year 
terms 
Secretary General: appointed 
by the Council and approved 
by the Assembly 
Instruments Conventions (binding once 
ratified by 2 member states), 
Recommendations (not 
binding, but subject to RBM 
reviews), Resolutions (not 
binding) 
Conventions (binding once 
enough states ratify, usually 
representing 50% of DWT), 












 ILO IMO 
Transparency Explicit transparency goals, 
well organized, published 
accounting of meetings 
(often verbatim), public 
meetings, even at the 
Governing Body level, live 
streams available for 
credentialed journalists. 
No explicit transparency 
goals, published but often 
vague meeting notes, closed 
door meetings, closed door 
Council elections with no 
vote accounting or explicit 
structure, journalists must 
sign NDAs, can’t disclose 
representatives identities or 
positions without consent.  
Vulnerable to conflicts of 
interest 
Yes, primarily through 
nondiscriminatory voluntary 
funding . 
Yes, private industry actors 
are allowed to represent and 
even vote for states. 
Balance of Representation Tripartite system balances 
States (50%) Employers 
(25%) and Workers (25%) 
across all three branches 
Heavily favors states that 
register much of the world’s 
DWT, and states with special 
interest in shipping 
Purview, related to shipping Only labor issues in shipping All issues related to maritime 
and international shipping 
Accountability RBM ensures that 
instruments are under 
constant review 
Conventions are periodically 
revisited and updated.  
Enforcement Flag states are expected to 
enforce binding instruments. 
Port states enforce binding 
instruments through PSC 
Flag states are expected to 
enforce binding instruments. 
Port states enforce binding 









Chapter 6: Port State Control as an Enforcement Mechanism 
 The international shipping regime complex is set up such that flag states are responsible 
for enforcing international instruments on their fleets despite often only nominal connections 
to many of their ships. Flag states, and particularly Flag of Convenience (FOC) states, are not 
equipped to enforce instruments due to lack of resources and proximity. In the case of FOC 
states, many of the functions of the state are actually managed by Classification Societies (CSs), 
and thus the private industry essentially represents itself. This is a clear conflict of interest. 
Enforcing instruments at the port state level is more effective because port states have the 
proximity and resources necessary. Port State Control (PSC) has been an effective regional 
response to issues caused by the peculiar features of the international shipping regime complex 
to a certain extent. The existence of PSC has affected shipowner choices of which flags to 
register with, but not whether or not to flag out in the first place. Although effective, PSC is far 
from a perfect solution as it causes some undesired side effects such as non-uniform 
application, and potentially causing ships to flag out more, although for different motivations.  
 This chapter starts by describing three focusing events that catalyzed the creation of PSC 
as an enforcement mechanism. Next it explains why it makes more sense to assign 
enforcement responsibility to port states rather than flag states. This should be somewhat clear 
by now: flag states lack the proximity and—at least to a certain extent—incentive to enforce 
international instruments. Port states have the proximity and resources to enforce instruments 
more effectively. After that, I will describe how PSC works in practice. Port state control officers 
(PSCOs) and port workers work in parallel to check certificates, inspect and monitor ships for 
possible violations of instruments. Then I will describe why this PSC works. Essentially, the 




enforcement of instruments at port states changes the incentive structure for shipowners and 
states. Finally, I consider some possible issues that PSC has created and some ways to address 
them.  
6.1 Focusing Events 
I have argued that flag states lack the proximity and incentive to enforce instruments. In 
the case of FOC states, they often go further, delegating out their regulatory responsibilities to 
private CSs, and thus ceding their authority to private industry actors. A series of focusing 
events made it clear that this peculiar assignment of authority to flag states to enforce 
international instruments was suboptimal and ineffective. 
The first focusing event, was the Amoco Cadiz oil spill in 1978. The European Community 
(EC) had already been working on creating an enforcement mechanism for International Labor 
Organization (ILO) Convention 147, which is concerned with the minimum safety and 
accommodation standards for seafarers.67 The Amoco Cadiz incident caused the EC to consider 
the role of CSs and FOCs in enforcing international instruments in pollution as well. At the time, 
the Amoco Cadiz oil spill was the largest oil spill on record—about twice as large as the previous 
record set during the Torrey Canyon incident in 1967; and resulted in the largest loss of marine 
life, including the death of over 20 thousand shore birds.68  
After the Amoco Cadiz oil spill in 1978, the EC decided that it was imperative for port 
states, not flag states, to enforce international instruments and regulations in shipping. 
Fourteen European states signed the Paris Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), creating a 
 
67 https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C147 
68 See https://www.itopf.org/in-action/case-studies/case-study/amoco-cadiz-france-1978/ 




task force of Port State Control Officers (PSCOs), to inspect and assess whether ships comply 
with binding international instruments and regulations. The advent of PSC through the Paris 
MOU created teeth for a regime complex that struggled to enforce conventions on a global 
scale and put pressure on FOCs and CSs to comply. The success of the Paris MOU would serve 
as an example for states in the regime to enact a series of other regional MOUs that together 
collectively enforce international instruments at most of the world’s major ports and trading 
states.69 
The next event was less of a focusing event than a shift in the international order. The 
end of the Cold War saw a renewed interest in the application of IOs in global governance. This 
renewed interest led to growth in regional institutions, and a deepening of existing regional 
authority. In this sense, international shipping was no different. In 1991, the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) adopted Resolution A. 682 (17),70 which was important in several 
ways. First, it made official the recognition that the peculiar assignment of authority to enforce 
international instruments was suboptimal and ineffective. “…In some cases it may be difficult 
for flag States to exercise full and continuous control over some ships entitled to fly their flag, 
for instance ships which do not regularly call at flag States’ national port.” Second, it noted that 
PSC as implemented by through the Paris MOU had been effective “in preventing, without 








regional efforts were uniquely situated to enforce international instruments with the potential 
to be more effective than flag states: 
BEING CONVINCED that regional co-operation in the application of port State control 
measures in all parts of the world would enhance international standards and could 
further contribute to preventing the operation of substandard ships, thus making a 
significant contribution to maritime safety and pollution prevention (IMO Resolution A. 
682 (17)) 
The Resolution encouraged states to form regional MOUs to pursue the kinds of PSC 
implemented through the Paris MOU. It invited the Secretary General of the IMO to fund the 
formation of regional MOUs, and invited members of the Paris MOU to assist in helping other 
regions set up regional MOUs. Over the next 13 years, eight regional MOUs were set up, and 
the US extended its PSC program to cargo ships.71 
The next focusing event occurred when the oil tanker Erika broke in half in during a 
massive storm in 1999, creating another substantial oil spill, this time off the coast of Brittany. 
The role of the Paris MOU was significantly expanded as a response. Like the Amoco Cadiz, the 
Erika oil spill resulted in a difficult cleanup effort and massive loss of marine life.72 The Erika 
also similarly demonstrated the ineffectiveness of a complicated regime complex that allowed 
for suboptimal oversight of ship conditions, this time on the part of CSs. The Erika was 
registered in Malta and certified by a CS which claimed it to be in good condition. The Erika 
incident made clear that CSs contracted by FOCs to certify ships’ compliance with IMO 
instruments were not doing an adequate job. As a result, the European Union (EU), which had 
more authority than the EC, proposed legislation that required its member states to make PSC 
 
71 US administers PSC through the Coast Guard. Previously it had only inspected cruise ships.  
72 See https://www.itopf.org/in-action/case-studies/case-study/erika-west-of-france-1999/ 




more robust by 2003. Under the new laws, ships over 15 years old that had been detained 
twice would be blacklisted, meaning that they would be refused entry to EU ports. Additionally, 
ships were subject to more rigorous inspections as they got older.73  
Then in 2001, 9/11 was also seen as a focusing event for the US and states around the 
world. It brought attention to the vulnerability of the world’s security in general, and the 
security of transportation infrastructure specifically. The realization was that a lot of damage 
could be inflicted with relatively little effort and resources by simply hijacking large vessels and 
exploding them in critical locations. This kind of attack could have ripple effects through the 
global economy, as it could massively disrupt supply chains. The aforementioned work by Flynn 
(2002) found that US port security was handled by multiple agencies with inefficient 
communication and thus extremely vulnerable to such attacks. A study by Booze Allen Hamilton 
found that two dirty bombs detonated in U.S. ports could result in a port shutdown of nine days 
costing $58 billion dollars, for instance (Donovan 2006). As a result, the US increased the 
security of its own PSC, which it conducts independently through the US Coast Guard 
 
73 The Erika was 24 years old at the time of the incident. 





Figure 7: Timeline of Regional MOU Development 
  




6.2 Port States are Better Enforcers than Flag States 
PSC can be seen as a regional response to a global problem. International organizations 
(IOs) like the IMO and ILO can bring together states, as actors, to sign international conventions 
with implications for international shipping, but the diffuse nature of the industry makes it 
nearly impossible for states to enforce their international commitments. Most dead weight 
tonnage (DWT) is registered by FOCs, which are small, developing states that lack not just the 
resources, but the proximity to enforce their international commitments. Many of the ships 
registered in FOCs rarely, if ever, actually call port in their flag states. Logistically, it doesn’t 
even make sense for FOCs to enforce their obligations. Meanwhile, especially in the case of 
liner shipping, many ships continuously follow the same routes, and call at the same ports 
where the same PSCOs and states can monitor their compliance with regulations and 
conventions.74 
 States can sign Conventions and claim to adhere to certain rules with good intentions, 
but the reality is, much of what Conventions and rules imply are expectations for how 
shipowners should conduct business. Like all shrewd business owners, shipowners seek creative 
solutions to lower costs and get around rules. In the case of increased labor standards for 
instance, Obando-Rojas et al. (2004) found that shipowners often pass the cost of continued 
education onto the seafarers. Because seafaring is already a fairly low-paid profession, some 
seafarers have actually created fraudulent certifications. Thus, some shipowners sought ways 
to forgo labor trainings for their seafarers, and in the process negated the positive effect the 
 
74 In bulk shipping, routes vary more.  




certification was intended to create. Counterfeit documents can be difficult to identify, even for 
trained PSCOs, though PSC is at least marginally effective at addressing the issue.75 
PSC operates as an important accountability check. It is an effective way to hold FOC 
states, CSs, and shipowners accountable because it creates a real threat to their bottom line. 
It’s important to consider that FOC states are, as Carlisle (1981) observed, essentially in the 
business of selling sovereignty. As is such, they outsource their duty of ensuring compliance to 
CSs because it is a prohibitively expensive and near physically impossible for small states to 
manage their enormous nominally registered fleets. FOCs behave like businesses—and CSs are 
businesses—and businesses seek to cut costs in ways to remain competitive. In this case that 
means employing cheap labor, and adhering laxly, if at all, to international regulations. Thus, in 
order to encourage good behavior, it is effective to threaten their profitability if they violate 
binding international Conventions.  
6.3 How Port State Control Works 
Regional groups of states create specific protocols for enforcing existing international 
instruments created by the ILO and IMO. There is some variation across MOUs in the way they 
deploy PSC, but the basic protocol is largely similar. When ships call at ports party to an MOU, 
PSCOs check all relevant certifications with regard to labor, safety, and environmental 
regulations. If there is any reason for suspicion, PSCOs can board ships, talk to and advise 
crewmembers, and make superficial checks to technical machinery. In most cases, PSCOs 
enforce instruments regardless of whether the flag state is party to the same instruments as 
 
75 According to Obando-Rojas et al., “Not all cases are sophisticated however, with Cypriot Port State Control 
Officers finding a 20 year-old holding a Master's certificate for example” (2004: p 299) 




the port state. If ships are found to be violating relevant instruments, they can be fined, and if 
they are found to be a repeat offender, they can be detained. Being detained involves PSCOs 
coordinating with port workers to stall unloading the ship for some period of time, usually a day 
or two. Delays in loading and unloading can result in supply chain disruptions, which can be 
costly and cause reputational damage. These effects can trickle through supply chains and 
cause producers and consumers to choose other shipping companies.  
Another function of MOUs is “naming and shaming.” MOUs keep lists of ships and states 
that routinely violate instruments. Blacklists include the worst offending states, CSs, and ships. 
Ships that are blacklisted are not allowed to call at ports in MOU region states. Gray lists are for 
states, CSs, and ships that are at risk of being blacklisted. Because these lists are kept publicly, 
shipping and exporting companies can check which lists states, CSs, and ships are on and factor 
reputational damage into their business decisions. Being detained at ports delays shipments, 
which causes ripple effects through supply chains, making businesses less profitable and less 
reliable. Thus, being on MOU black and gray lists makes states and CSs more risky business 
partners. Black and gray lists then encourage actors to modify their behavior and increase 
compliance with international instruments. MOUs use PSC as an enforcement mechanism, 
which ultimately makes the regime more effective at regulating.  
 Ultimately, the wide implementation of regional MOUs and PSC has limited shipowners’ 
ability to region shop. With most of the coastal states in the world part of at least one MOU, 
there are diminishingly few opportunities for shipowners to call at ports with no oversight. 
Originally PSC had been effective because it limited access to the valuable ability to trade with 
Europe. In a more globalized world, wide uptake has made PSC even more effective by limiting   






























violating shipowners from doing business with nearly all major trading regions. Put more 
succinctly, regionalism has strengthened global governance. 
6.4 Why Port State Control Works 
 The existing set of international instruments was not efficient or effective because it 
placed the authority of enforcement on flag states. PSC has created a regionalized response by 
moving the authority of enforcement to port states. By doing so, MOUs changed actor 
expectations and behavior. Perennial offenders of IMO and ILO instruments could now 
reasonably expect that their ships would be fined, boarded, delayed and possibly blacklisted at 
MOU ports. This would inflict restrictions and reputational costs on their business model and 
create a new set of choices. Violators could either give up doing business at MOU controlled 
ports and push into less regulated markets, or they could increase their compliance to improve 
their reputations at MOU controlled ports. Because the first MOU applied to most European 
ports—and serviced a constellation of developed states with high demand for expensive 
imports and exports—it made losing the ability to import and export into Europe a difficult 
choice for violators to make. Ultimately, it made more sense for most violators to improve their 
behavior and not have their existing services disrupted. Though not perfect, PSC as a regional 
approach has been effective for the most part. Van Leeuwen found that “Regionalization within 
maritime governance has been instrumental in increasing the effectiveness of maritime 
governance, both in terms of setting stricter [standards] as in increasing enforcement of these 
standards.” (Van Leeuwen 2014: p 30) 
 PSC effectively changes the incentive structure for the registries that ship the most 
tonnage. If they can expect the ships they register to get inspected more often, it would make 




sense to increase their compliance in order to maintain business efficiency. Because potential 
business partners can look at public MOU black, white, and gray lists, they will likely pick 
registries that are less likely to cause delays in their schedules. Thus, it should be expected that 
the registries with the highest DWT, should comply at high levels, so as to maintain high levels 
of registry and rent collection through registration fees and taxes. Indeed, top shipping states, 
particularly the top five FOCs, comply with most international shipping instruments. Panama, 
Liberia, the Marshall Islands, Hong Kong, and Singapore combined register over 50% of the 
world’s DWT, and comply with the IMO and ILO instruments at a higher level than states on 
average according the ICS’s Flag State Performance Table, and all five are whitelisted on both 
the Paris and Tokyo MOUs.76 
6.5 Port State Control is Not a Perfect Solution 
 Although the PSC system has increased the effectiveness of the international shipping 
regime complex, it is far from perfect. The main issue that PSC struggles with is uniform 
application. The multiple existing MOUs are applied across multiple states and ports and 
employ a multitude of PSCOs all with implications for uneven application.  
Despite its ever increasing role in policing the world’s fleets, port state control does not 
have a uniform application in all different regions and sometimes not even within the 
same region of the MOU. With the increase in the number of MOUs and the member 
states of these MOU’s, the number of countries entitled to PSC inspection increases. 
This enlargement increases the risk of varied standards of inspectors and inspections. 
Therefore, even the establishment of an internationally uniform standard of 
competence of inspectors will not necessarily provide a solution; as such a standard 
could again be subject to different interpretations. (Özçayir 2009: p 238). 
 
76 The Paris and Tokyo MOUs are the only MOUs on the ICS Flag State Performance Table. The Paris MOU covers 
most of Western Europe, and the Tokyo MOU covers most of East Asia, two of the most connected shipping 
regions.  




Ships travelling between ports may not know what to expect from specific PSC inspections. The 
Paris MOU, for instance, is known to be the strictest. Thus, shipowners might understand that a 
lower standard applies when calling port outside of Europe. They will then designate 
substandard ships or ships that are likely to get inspected and detained most often to regions of 
the world with worse implementation of PSC. This practice is known as “region shopping” (Bang 
and Jang 2012: p 184). This creates a sort of paradox: PSC was created to enforce regulations 
and improve shipowner behavior. Meanwhile, the worst quality ships flock to the most 
unregulated regions of the market, concentrating highly compliant ships in strong MOUs and 
low compliant ships in weak MOUs, where behavioral change is needed the most.  
The non-uniformity of PSC also presents challenges to its perceived legitimacy, as well as 
creates market effects. Certain ports may strictly enforce certain instruments on certain state 
registries. This creates the image of bullying, which can cause ships to avoid certain ports, 
creating distortion in market expectations.  
Discrepancies in harmonization and implementation erode the goal of setting a single 
inspection standard within a region with technical and economic implications for the 
industry and policy makers. Last but not least, differences in implementation could 
affect the operations of PSC and hamper the overarching objective of ensuring 
compliance with the international legal framework for safety, pollution prevention and 
labour conditions on board vessels. (Graziano et al. 2018: p 107) 
 
Graziano’s study was an examination of exclusively European ports. Extrapolating non uniform 
application of PSC to all the different MOUs, the issue becomes compounded for PSC as a 
regional approach to enforcing international instruments. Thus, it follows that a necessary 
improvement to PSC would be a standardization of operating procedures across MOUs, states, 
and ports.  




Even more confusing might be that many states are part of overlapping MOUs, and thus 
it may not even be possible to apply PSC protocols in standard and predictable ways. The 
existence of MOU overlap might make the establishment and potential membership of new 
MOUs more difficult to negotiate, leading to paralysis, as described in the spaghetti bowl 
argument first developed by Bhagwati (1995) in reference to free trade agreements (FTAs). The 
basic concept is that states make overlapping FTAs of both bilateral and multilateral character. 
The existence of multiple overlapping FTAs makes the process of creating new FTAs more 
difficult, because each state party to the FTA has to make sure new FTAs they are negotiating 
won’t cause them to violate any old FTAs they are party to. In this vision of regime complexity, 
the process of creating new FTAs becomes difficult and protracted, and new agreements can 
only make trade slower and more complicated. Shipping at its core is an issue that requires 
bilateral, if not multilateral coordination. Thus, the same issues observed in coordinating FTAs 
can easily apply to the non-uniformity of MOU enforcement protocols. It follows that some 
form of coordination of PSC protocol between MOUs would be beneficial both for shipowners 
and for the shipping regime complex. 
 Finally, Fan et al. find that PSC can actually lead to ships flagging out more. “While it is 
generally believed that PSC inspection places greater priority on FOC ships, which is assumed to 
deter flagging out behavior, the results actually show that PSC inspection makes a positive 
contribution to flagging out” (Fan et al. 2014: p 356). This is probably because strong PSC 
measures encourage FOC states to increase compliance in order to compete for shipowners 
looking for FOC flags that get inspected the least. Essentially, the likelihood of a ship getting 
inspected becomes an important consideration when flagging out, and so FOCs that are less 




likely to attract PSC attention become more valuable than those that attract more PSC 
attention. Mitroussi and Arghyrou (2016) find that FOCs are more likely to be successful at 
collecting rents if they run their shipping policy smoothly in order to give shipowners 
confidence and have a friendly tax policy. Clearly, picking a registry is more of a business 
decision than a political one. As is such, shipowners will balance low costs in taxes and fees with 
low likelihood of getting inspected and delayed. Thus, although PSC may lead to states flagging 
out more, it has changed the incentive for doing so. With PSC, shipowners look to balance the 
smooth flow of business with savings in cost, whereas before they were only concerned with 
the latter. In this sense, PSC is not a perfect solution, but it does incentivize shipowners to 
comply more or face punishment.  
6.6 Toward a More Effective Port State Control 
 The use of regional MOUs created an enforcement mechanism that international 
shipping regime complex previously lacked. PSC made the regime complex more efficient, by 
moving authority to enforce instruments to port states rather than flag states. Outcomes, 
however, have not been entirely optimal, because the PSC system lacks uniform application, 
with some states having the added complexity of being party to multiple MOUs, and ultimately 
may lead to more flagging out. But PSC could achieve more optimal outcomes in the following 
ways: First, MOUs should collaborate to create uniform standards and practices. This would 
deter offending shipowners from sending their worst performing ships to the least stringent 
MOU regions. Second, PSC should be applied in both targeted and random fashion. Random 
PSC checks would increase legitimacy by signaling to shipowners that they are not being bullied. 
At the same time, targeted PSC checks would encourage all underperforming states to 




harmonize upward, thus raising the floor and reducing the competitive advantage of FOCs. This 
could reduce flagging out. Finally, PSC checks should be ramped up at the busiest ports 
worldwide. Doing so would send the signal that offending shipowners cannot slip through the 
cracks simply because these ports are too busy to be effective.  
 All MOUs should collaborate on creating uniform procedures and standards. Doing so 
would send the signal to offending ships and shipowners that they can’t just “region shop” poor 
quality ships in parts of the world that apply standards less strictly. Uniform standards could 
also increase the legitimacy of the MOUs in less strict regions. It would also eliminate any 
confusion around how states in multiple MOUs apply PSC. Additionally, uniform standards and 
procedures may have the added side effect of pushing poor quality ships into retirement 
quicker, thus increasing building of ships to modern standards with positive downstream effects 
for laborers and the environment.  
 PSC has been criticized, rightly, for targeting ships registered in developing states while 
giving a pass to ships registered in developed states. For that reason, PSC should be applied in a 
two-tiered fashion: random and targeted. Random checks would increase the perceived 
legitimacy of PSC to developing states. It may also help in encouraging other regional MOUs to 
apply PSC more stringently, as it won’t be thought of purely as a bullying method imposed on 
the South by the North. Random checks would also make developed states’ registered ships 
more accountable. Targeted PSC checks should continue as well. Targeted checks signal to 
offending registries that PSC should be taken seriously, and that they need to improve their 
standards. The result of applying both targeted and random checks would hopefully be a raising 




of the floor effect for offending states, leading to a reduction in competitive advantage 
amongst FOC states. A raised floor would also reduce the incentive of shipowners to flag out.  
 Last, at the very least PSC should be increased at the world’s busiest ports. One of the 
largest threats to the international shipping regime complex is its inability to build capacity at 
the same pace as the growth of trade and traffic of shipping. As is such, offending ships may 
seek busy ports, as it is easier to slip through the cracks when there is pressure to maximize the 
speed of flow through the busiest ports. Increasing checks at the busiest ports signals to 
shipowners that noncompliance will not be tolerated, regardless of the amount of pressure 
trade puts on the global logistics system.  
Summary 
 MOUs provide a regional response to an issue that international efforts fail to address. It 
is not reasonable to expect flag states to enforce international instruments given that the FOC 
system puts insurmountable distance between states and the ships on their registries. Thus, 
port states are in the optimal position to provide the necessary enforcement mechanism to 
international instruments. The implementation of PSC puts economic and reputational pressure 
on states to comply at higher levels and has been effective in changing the behavior of the 
registries and CSs. However, the regional nature of MOUs cause uniformity issues that have 
downstream implications for their implementation and legitimacy. PSC can be made more 
effective through better coordination of standards and procedures of regional MOUs, 
implementing both random and targeted checks, and increasing capacity at the busiest ports 
worldwide.  





 International shipping is a space that embodies many of the concepts and issues in 
International Relations (IR). First and foremost, it is fundamentally anarchic. Although there are 
different sources of power, legitimacy, and authority that operate in the space, there is no 
dominant actor or governing body that has a monopoly on power. Shipping is a reflection of the 
current international order in this way. But international shipping is different than other areas 
of global governance in crucial ways including its peculiar distribution of power and authority, 
and its diffuse rendering of territoriality. Ships exist in multiple locations. They can be built one 
place, owned in another, registered in another, and broken in yet another. But for the most 
part, ships exist between states because they spend most of their time in transit.  
Second, the diffuse nature of spatially locating and regulating international shipping 
poses unique challenges to governing in international shipping. In a lot of ways, ships reflect the 
complicated nature of governing globalized sectors and issues such as finance, labor, and 
climate change. Private actors are allowed to shift the source of certain aspects of their 
business in a way that best suit their profits. This drives states to compete for the ability to 
capture rents, and toward a specialization of resources and services. Much like global financial 
companies and capitalists locate their resources in offshore bank accounts and labor in states 
with lower labor costs, shipping companies register their ships in the states that traditionally 
offered the benefits of cheap labor costs and low regulatory compliance. States like Panama 
and Liberia were able to pioneer this practice in a way that drove a specialization of services to 
globalize.  




Third, the increasingly global specialization of the international shipping industry 
necessitated the coordination of behavioral expectations, rules, norms, and principles through 
a diverse set of actors such as states, IOs, regional institutions, transnational organizations, 
NGOs, private industry actors, and unions. The unique character of the international shipping 
regime complex created multiple overlapping spaces and efforts that allow actors to influence 
the regime in ways that confer them the most benefits and result in a convoluted process that 
ultimately makes governing more difficult.  
Fourth, considerable differences between the two IOs that govern in the international 
shipping space have implications for the effectiveness of the regime complex. The International 
Maritime Organization (IMO), as the main IO that governs in the space, is heavily influenced by 
the states and actors that it ought to rein in. It lacks accountability for the instruments that it 
creates, transparency, and an effective enforcement mechanism. The International Labor 
Organization (ILO) has a far better design, primarily because it prioritizes balancing the 
representation of states, employers, and workers in an evenhanded way. The explicit equal 
inclusion of workers in every organ of the ILO ensures that the most vulnerable party in the 
space has a seat at the table and their concerns are represented and addressed. Unfortunately, 
its purview is necessarily limited to labor issues, which are only part of the issue set that the 
regime complex needs to address. Moreover, both IOs lack an effective enforcement 
mechanism.  
Fifth, because of an ineffectiveness of international institutions—not just IOs, but 
international law—regarding the ability to enforce binding instruments, regional efforts have 
sprung up that have shown potential to be more effective. Port State Control (PSC) exists as a 




constellation of sets of common rules for port states to enforce the binding instruments of both 
the ILO and the IMO on their member states. PSC was a necessary addition to the shipping 
regime complex because of the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) critical decision that 
officially placed the responsibility of enforcing binding instruments on flag states. The issue 
with this critical decision was that FOC states lack the proximity, resources, and incentive to 
enforce instruments. Port states, as the states that actually have physical access to ships, are 
much better suited for enforcing binding instruments.  
Sixth, all of the peculiar features of the regime complex developed over time, through 
dynamic processes. The container, as a force multiplier, increased the growth of a trade which 
compounded a complex set of issues that would already be difficult to govern even in a healthy 
functioning regime. The long lifecycle of ships also exacerbates the slow pace of change and the 
regime complex’s ability to progress toward more effective governance. These features put 
pressure on the regimes complex’s inability to create optimal and efficient governance.  
Lastly, The fact that the regime complex developed through dynamic processes suggests 
that there is reason for optimism that the regime complex can become more optimal. The fact 
that PSC developed largely as a response to certain focusing events indicates that change 
toward an optimal regime is possible.   
Toward an Optimal Regime 
Although the international shipping regime complex has peculiar design features and 
operates at a suboptimal level, significant changes could increase its ability to govern. First, the 
institutional design of the IMO could be overhauled to mitigate the effects of flagging out. One 




of the most important changes would be to shift authority away from flag states in at least one 
critical way. This shift needs to occur first in the way states are represented in the IMO. Voting 
power in the Assembly should be adjusted such that FOC states don’t simply have weight 
proportionate to their largely nominal registries. This could be done by giving more weight to 
state of beneficial ownership, which is calculated by UNCTAD, and balancing that measure 
evenly with a simple “one state one vote” measure. This would ensure that the most vested 
stakeholders still had a say to a certain extent—which is important because it maintains a sense 
of legitimacy—but that FOC states and private industry stakeholders weren’t able to totally 
control the bargaining process.  
The IMO should mitigate against industry capture by explicitly balancing actor 
representation—of government and private industry actors with seafarers, port workers, 
marine biologists, climate scientists etc.—in a way similar to the ILO’s tripartite structure. This 
would help ensure that private industry stakeholders don’t have a near monopoly in the 
instrument creation process. This is important because it makes little sense that private 
industry stakeholders should be creating the rules by which they govern themselves.  
The assignment of authority to enforce international instruments should be explicitly 
shifted to port states, not flag states. Flag states never made much sense as enforcers of 
international instruments, especially as certain states relegate the management of the 
registries to CSs, which essentially give private industry stakeholders authority to govern their 
own behavior. The IMO has already tacitly endorsed shifting authority of enforcement to port 
states via Resolution A.682 (17). Explicitly shifting authority to port states in both the IMO and 
ICJ would increase the legitimacy of regional MOUs and PSC.  




Regional MOUs need to work to create a uniform application of PSC. Doing so could 
significantly reduce noncompliance on the part of shipowners. If MOU standards and 
procedures were conceived of and applied uniformly across all regions, it would reduce the 
incentive to “region shop” underperforming ships. Additionally, this could have the beneficial 
side effect of pushing underperforming ships into retirement early, thus expediting uptake of 
safer and greener technology.  
PSC inspections should be applied in both targeted and random fashion. Doing so could 
increase compliance and legitimacy.77 Targeted inspections are important, as certain ships, 
owners and flags are known to routinely violate international instruments. Targeting these 
actors will increase their incentives to comply. Random inspections will decrease the perception 
that PSC is used as a tool to bully developing FOC states, and thus increase its legitimacy.  
More coordination between IOs and regional MOUs would help create a more effective 
all-around regime.78 Better communication between the two levels of governance would 
incentivize good shipowner behavior by increasing accountability. Violations of international 
instruments should be reported and accounted for in the IMO and ILO. States that routinely 
violate international instruments should lose the ability to serve on the IMO Council. This will 
incentivize flag states to enforce instruments on their registered shipowners. Even if authority 
in representation and enforcement is shifted to port states, adding another layer of 
 
77 The US Coast Guard does targeted and random checks, for instance detailed in Norris (2011: p 90-92). 
78 The MOUs do conference calls via the IMO and have acknowledged that more coordination is needed. “The PSC 
regimes agreed on the need to work together to develop harmonized port State control practices and policies to 
ensure a consistent approach across the world and also welcomed the coordinating role of IMO” (States News 
Service 2020: p NA)  




accountability will likely increase good shipowner behavior and encourage flag states to 
disallow the registration of shipowners that routinely violate instruments.  
 With all of these changes in place, the international shipping regime complex would 
start to resemble a healthier functioning and more well-coordinated regime. Authority in 
representation and enforcement would be shifted to more logical places. Legitimacy would be 
increased on both the international and regional levels. Accountability measures would be 
implemented in a way that reduced the incentive to flag out. These changes may seem far-
fetched, but the history of focusing events that originally triggered better enforcement suggest 
that the regime complex is reactive and dynamic enough to change with time. Implementing 
these changes would have lasting positive effects on the labor, environmental, and security 
issues detailed in this thesis.  
Further Research Ideas 
Inasmuch as international shipping is a lens through which to operationalize various IR 
arguments, it suggests avenues for further research. First, there is copious data published by 
the UN, UNCTAD, the IMO, ILO, ICS etc. about which states lead in which areas of the industry. 
There is also lots of data about how much tonnage each states ship, register, how many ships 
they own etc. Data could drive such research questions as:  
• Do FOC states use their DWT voting power to veto instruments using bloc voting?; 
• Do private industry actors influence instrument construction in the IMO?; 
• Do increased detentions cause shipowners to switch registries?  




Because the IMO Council is not transparent, it would be valuable for academic researchers to 
obtain authorization and observe voting behavior as well as instrument construction, if at all 
possible.79 Attending IMO Council and Assembly sessions could even be approached 
ethnographically. These events happen in the same location at regular times each year and see 
a convergence of the many actors in the regime complex come together in a centralized place 
to exert influence on the governing process. This approach could drive such research questions 
as: 
• How do private industry actors influence the bargaining process in instrument creation? 
• Which industries have the most representation in the IMO? 
• How do actors move between spaces, such as the WSC/ISC/ITF on one hand, and the 
IMO bodies on the other? 
Finally, though there have been several books about the effect of containerization, 
biographical research on its creator Malcolm MacLean is probably warranted. There doesn’t 
seem to be much information about him even though the container was one of the most 
consequential inventions of the last 70 years. The use of the container accelerated our global 
connectedness in ways similar to the information revolution and increased global productivity 
in ways similar to the industrial revolution. And yet little is known or written about the person 
that catalyzed that acceleration. 
 
79 Hendrikson did this for his dissertation (see works cited) but approached it from a business management view. 





  International shipping is a great political space to realize many relevant theories and 
conversations in IR. It can be used to illustrate arguments in topics including globalization and 
global governance, sovereignty, hegemony, institutional design, international law, regime 
theories, and regionalism. As a political space, it offers a uniquely concrete or physical sense in 
which to apply ideas from these conversations and theories: raw materials and finished goods 
are created and transported between states in measurable ways. At the same time, legitimacy 
and authority over sectors of the issue area are explicitly located in states where they may or 
may not truly exist. Where power lies seems obvious at first blush but is actually opaque upon 
further study. In fact, power in shipping lies in places not suspected from surface-level statistics 
and analysis. This makes it completely fascinating as a topic; yet it is critically understudied in 
IR.  
 In addition to being an interesting political space to apply arguments in certain IR 
conversations, international shipping is a relatively elegant space to study ideas about 
approaching collective action problems. As one of the first truly globalized industries, shipping 
requires a massive amount of coordination between states and other actors to address far-
reaching problems that are unsolvable otherwise. Lessons learned could be applied to many 
other far-reaching and inscrutable problems. Scholars of IR and other practices should take care 
and notice of this fascinating topic and toward the implications it has for addressing issues in 
other topics.  
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